On 04 Aug 2014, at 21:39, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 3:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 04 Aug 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
>> Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry?
> You.
BULLSHIT.
>> One will see Moscow and one will not, nobody thinks that is
symmetrical. If things were symmetrical there would only be one
person regardless of how many bodies there were; there needs to be
a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to be
meaningful.
> Good. You disagreed with this some time ago.
BULLSHIT.
> just a very simple case of first person indeterminacy.
Which is just a pompous and needlessly complex way of saying "I
don't know".
You progress.
Precisely: I don't know if it will be W or M, but I know for sure
(assuming comp and the protocol) that it will something in the set
{W, M}.
> we get that first person indetermlinacy from logic and the
working of a computer
The idea that we can't know what we will see or do next came from
that great thinker Og the caveman and he used induction not logic
to develop it;
Boltzman killed himself as people mocked his "ridiculous idea" of
bringing statistics in classical deterministic physics.
Conceptually, that kind of indeterminacy brought by Boltzman is
accepted today, and is explained by the laws of big numbers.
Then quantum mechanics seemed to introduce an stronger form of
indeterminacy, but the many-worlders know better, and take it as a
FPI on the universal wave or matrix.
The strongest form of QM indeterminacy is Heisenberg's Uncertainty
Principle. Does comp predict that?
With Everett, the QM indeterminacy becomes a particular case of the
FPI, and the "observable" of the classical comp physics obeys enough
QL to expect something like Heisenberg" Uncertainty. The UDA points is
only that it has to be like that in the comp theory. The physical laws
are independent of the choice of the initial ontological theory. By
occam, we can take the numbers (+ their lawas), or the combinators.
The Fourier transform aspects of it is still not derived, of course.
Bruno
Richard
Then the comp FPI is the simplest and strongest form of
indeterminacy. It does not need the quantum physics assumption, and
it does not need big numbers (although they can help). but it raizes
a problem, as eventually, we have to explain the quantum wave from
the FPI on arithmetic (but this needs step 4, 5, 6, 7/8).
Again, the point is that if you accept this, the real question is:
do you accept that the indeterminacy on what you (the H-guy) can
expect remains unchanged when we add a delay on one branch. I see
that you snip the very question I asked you.
he remembered that he didn't know what he would do next in the past
and he figured that trend, just like everything else, would
probably continue into the future. Only much later did Turing
discover that the same conclusion could be derived from logic.
Unsolvability and uncomputability leads to other form of
indeterminacies, in the long run of a program execution. it has
nothing to do with the self-duplication indeterminacy (even if both
used diagonalisation when made technical, but the use of the
diagonalization is different).
Again, I already explained this to you.
> the guy in Moscow see moscow, and not washington, you have to
agree that his [HIS?!!!] prediction "w & m" was wrong
As usual Bruno Marchal can't continue without a ambiguous pronoun
fix, in this case it's "his".
His is obviously you, when you are still not duplicated, in Helsinki.
You come back on this point infinitely often, yet I told you, that I
accompany you, going to Helsinki in plane, and I ask you what do you
expect to live as experience, in the usual sense of you, before the
duplication. Now, above you did answer "I don't know". That is a
progress compared to your older symmetric "W and M", which a kid in
high school can show to be refuted by any of your consistent
continuations.
> is that possible when we assume comp? What do you think?
What do I think? I think that I don't give a rat's ass about "comp".
Here you snip the whole step 4 question. And your answer is out of
topics as nobody give a rat's ass about you taste.
Sorry, but your failure to grasp UDA seems to be due to your
prejudice against my person (cf your recent lies on me), or at least
your total unwillingness to proceed, despite understanding well the
question, and getting the answer (recurrently).
Each time you suddenly do understand the step 3, you hand wave with
"too much easy", "trivial", "obvious", "caveman" ...
but then just go to the next step, please, or explain why you don't,
and still criticize the conclusion.
Bruno
John K Clark
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