On 14 August 2014 07:35, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/13/2014 6:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 12 Aug 2014, at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Hi, >>> >>> I think it is better I let you discuss a little bit. >>> >>> Yes Russell made a nice introduction to this problematic. >>> >>> Below, I just put a <comment>, which you might try to guess from my >>> preview post (notably to Brent) on this issue. >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12 Aug 2014, at 02:48, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 8/11/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote: >>>> >>>>> I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It seems >>>>> to be that the argument goes ... >>>>> >>>>> Assume computational process A is conscious >>>>> Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same machine >>>>> states as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by a recording of A >>>>> - B isn't conscious because it isn't counterfactually correct. >>>>> >>>>> I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume >>>>> consciousness doesn't supervene on material processes, then neither A nor >>>>> B >>>>> is conscious, they are just somehow attached to conscious experiences >>>>> generated elsewhere, maybe by a UD.) >>>>> >>>> >>>> It doesn't work, because it ignores the fact that consciousness is >>>> about something. It can only exist in the context of thoughts (machine >>>> states and processes) referring to a "world"; being part of a >>>> representational and predictive model. Without the counterfactuals, it's >>>> just a sequence of states and not a model of anything. But in order that >>>> it be a model it must interact or have interacted in the past in order that >>>> the model be causally connected to the world. It is this connection that >>>> gives meaning to the model. Because Bruno is a logician he tends to think >>>> of consciousness as performing deductive proofs, executing a proof in the >>>> sense that every computer program is a proof. He models belief as proof. >>>> But this overlooks where the meaning of the program comes from. >>>> >>> >>> <can you guess my future comment here?> >>> >> >> You might say that I model mind and belief ([]p), and the whole working >> of a computer, by proof in arithmetic, but with comp, it has to be valid at >> the correct susbstitution level for the case of correct machines. >> >> But for consciousness, I model it by knowledge (modal logic S4), which I >> obtained from the Theaetetus' method applied on belief/provability ([]p & >> p). Then I insist that this is not modeled by *anything* you can define >> exclusively with 3p terms. >> > > Insisting sounds like an attempt to cut off debate.
It would be polite to point out that you realise that isn't what Bruno is doing, as I assume you do realise - i.e. that you are just pointing out a language nuance. Otherwise you sound argumentative, when presumably that isn't your intention. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
