Hi,
I think it is better I let you discuss a little bit.
Yes Russell made a nice introduction to this problematic.
Below, I just put a <comment>, which you might try to guess from my
preview post (notably to Brent) on this issue.
On 12 Aug 2014, at 02:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/11/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It
seems to be that the argument goes ...
Assume computational process A is conscious
Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same machine
states as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by a
recording of A - B isn't conscious because it isn't
counterfactually correct.
I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume
consciousness doesn't supervene on material processes, then neither
A nor B is conscious, they are just somehow attached to conscious
experiences generated elsewhere, maybe by a UD.)
It doesn't work, because it ignores the fact that consciousness is
about something. It can only exist in the context of thoughts
(machine states and processes) referring to a "world"; being part of
a representational and predictive model. Without the
counterfactuals, it's just a sequence of states and not a model of
anything. But in order that it be a model it must interact or have
interacted in the past in order that the model be causally connected
to the world. It is this connection that gives meaning to the
model. Because Bruno is a logician he tends to think of
consciousness as performing deductive proofs, executing a proof in
the sense that every computer program is a proof. He models belief
as proof. But this overlooks where the meaning of the program comes
from.
<can you guess my future comment here?>
People that want to deny computers can be conscious point out that
the meaning comes from the programmer. But it doesn't have to. If
the computer has goals and can learn and act within the world then
its internal modeling and decision processes get meaning through
their potential for actions.
This is why I don't agree with the conclusion drawn from step 8. I
think the requirement to counterfactually correct implies that a
whole world, a physics, needs to be simulated too, or else the Movie
Graph or Klara need to be able to interact with the world to supply
the meaning to their program. But if the Movie Graph computer is a
counterfactually correct simulation of a person within a simulated
world, there's no longer a "reversal". Simulated consciousness
exists in simulated worlds - dog bites man.
Bruno
Brent
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