On 12 Aug 2014, at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi,
I think it is better I let you discuss a little bit.
Yes Russell made a nice introduction to this problematic.
Below, I just put a <comment>, which you might try to guess from my
preview post (notably to Brent) on this issue.
On 12 Aug 2014, at 02:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/11/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It
seems to be that the argument goes ...
Assume computational process A is conscious
Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same
machine states as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by
a recording of A - B isn't conscious because it isn't
counterfactually correct.
I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume
consciousness doesn't supervene on material processes, then
neither A nor B is conscious, they are just somehow attached to
conscious experiences generated elsewhere, maybe by a UD.)
It doesn't work, because it ignores the fact that consciousness is
about something. It can only exist in the context of thoughts
(machine states and processes) referring to a "world"; being part
of a representational and predictive model. Without the
counterfactuals, it's just a sequence of states and not a model of
anything. But in order that it be a model it must interact or have
interacted in the past in order that the model be causally
connected to the world. It is this connection that gives meaning
to the model. Because Bruno is a logician he tends to think of
consciousness as performing deductive proofs, executing a proof in
the sense that every computer program is a proof. He models belief
as proof. But this overlooks where the meaning of the program
comes from.
<can you guess my future comment here?>
You might say that I model mind and belief ([]p), and the whole
working of a computer, by proof in arithmetic, but with comp, it has
to be valid at the correct susbstitution level for the case of correct
machines.
But for consciousness, I model it by knowledge (modal logic S4), which
I obtained from the Theaetetus' method applied on belief/provability
([]p & p). Then I insist that this is not modeled by *anything* you
can define exclusively with 3p terms. Indeed that (meta) definition,
in the comp-arithmetical frame makes knowledge being a non
propositional attitude. I am even led (may be influenced by salvia) to
the idea that consciousness is more in the "& p" than in []p. The
proof aspect of the brain machinery would be a filter of consciousness
and memory, and consciousness itself is more in the complementary of
what is provable. The meaning comes from truth, not proof.
People that want to deny computers can be conscious point out that
the meaning comes from the programmer. But it doesn't have to. If
the computer has goals and can learn and act within the world then
its internal modeling and decision processes get meaning through
their potential for actions.
OK.
This is why I don't agree with the conclusion drawn from step 8. I
think the requirement to counterfactually correct implies that a
whole world, a physics, needs to be simulated too, or else the
Movie Graph or Klara need to be able to interact with the world to
supply the meaning to their program.
Hmm... If you want the full counterfactualness of a *universal*
machine, you need the UD*, and thus the full sigma_1 complete reality,
which is tiny compared to the full arithmetical truth, but still
infinitely bigger than known physical universe.
Then with a computer, the interaction with the environment are finite,
and can be re-entered in the computer machinery locally, and the MGA
can be resume again.
But if the Movie Graph computer is a counterfactually correct
simulation of a person within a simulated world, there's no longer
a "reversal".
Why?
Bruno
Simulated consciousness exists in simulated worlds - dog bites man.
Bruno
Brent
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