On 19 Aug 2014, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/19/2014 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 09:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 August 2014 15:20, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/17/2014 8:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations,
which exist
necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the physics.
Yes, I agreed to that. The question was can consciousness
supervene on
computations that do not instantiate any physics? I think not.
I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be
part of a
computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole
universe
complete with physics.
That's answering the converse question. So if the early universe
was
instantiated by a computation (a computation that instantiated
physics) then
you think that part of the early universe was a sustained stream of
consciousness. How do you conceive of this consciousness'
relation to the
physics? For example might it be some structure in the inflaton
field? Or
do you think of it as separate from physical structures?
I think of consciousness as a side-effect of, at least, the
computations that give rise to the type of behaviour we observe in
intelligently-behaving entities. It could also be that much simpler
computations have a much simpler consciousness, i.e. panpsychism,
but
I don't know how to prove this; it's hard enough to prove that even
other people are conscious.
However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation
can
instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a
recording, a
Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
possibilities
have been used as arguments against computationalism or to
arbitrarily
restrict computationalism.
Why is it arbitrary to say that a computation that is very
simple, has not
possible branchings for example, cannot be conscious while some
more complex
computation, one controlling an autonomous Mars Rover for
example, may be?
What is arbitrary is to say that a computer that has unused
components
inactivated, as per Maudlin or Bruno's MGA, is unconscious or
differently conscious.
Do you agree with Bruno that consciousness is all-or-nothing?
No, I think there are different degrees of consciousness.
Unless we have a vocabulary problem, this seems to contradict your
fading qualia argument. If you allow degrees of consciousness, it
becomes unclear why we can't have partial zombie. The guy would
still say "I don't feel any change", but actually would be less and
less conscious, just unconsciously so.
When I say that consciousness is all-or-nothing, I just mean that
either someone is conscious, or is not. It does not mean that there
are no consciousness state which looks like, when we come back from
them, as being slightly conscious. Those are only special altered
state of consciousness.
If your altered state of consciousness has no self-awareness, is it
still "consciousness"?
I agree with Plotinus that consciousness is always self-consciousness,
and in fact 1p-self consciousness.
Unless you explain some nuance, I use awareness as synonyme of
consciousness (but in some thread with Russell, we need to make a
nuance, but not in this topic)
And there's self-consciousness, i.e. being aware you are thinking.
There are two self-consciousness:
3p-self 1p-self-consciousness, which is the mundane state, where the
1p-self becomes aware of its body, and can even identify itself with it.
1p-self 1p-self-consciousness, which is more like 1p-self-
consciousness regained by abstraction or dissociation or amnesia of
the 3p-self in the 3p-self 1p-self-consciousness. That is
"enlightenment", roughly speaking.
Those are only poles in a complex ocean of selves.
So it's not 'fading' qualia, it different categories of consciousness.
In case of some states in dream, OK. But it is harder to claim that
could be used to defeat Chalmers in the piece by piece digital
functional substitution (at the right level).
I'd say my dog has self-awareness, e.g. he knows his name. But I'm
not so sure he is self-conscious.
I don't stop to expand the range of living beings which might be
conscious. I am open that all animals above the octopus, cuttlefish,
perhaps some spider are self-conscious. They can do induction, and so
you can fail them, for a time. They are Löbian, they are conscious
like you, me and PA.
I am open that forest are self-conscious, on larger scale, by the
complexity of the relation between vegetals and bacteria, in the soil.
I don't know, but is hard to evaluate the threshold of complexity of
complex dynamical (recursive, or not) processes when given only sparse
3p clues.
The koi in my pond are aware, but I doubt they are self-aware.
OK. Plausible.
They are universal, but not Löbian. It is bit like RA, or the UD, or
the basic ontology. In a sense, they are less deluded or less delude-
able, and from some perspective they share more easily the immaculate
or unaffected (by the arithmetical lies) universal consciousness of
the universal machine (a consciousness quite different from the usual
one, which might be out of time, and whose existence and
expressibility would be impossible for vast collections of machines
and nameable non-machines.
The arithmetical reality is quite a pond.
Bruno
Brent
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