Just to get back to the topic for a moment. Do I read correctly that the difference between Russell and Bruno lies in whether a "raw", in Bruno's usage, computation in terms of UD* is "actualized" (vs. what precisely? A kind of "emanating non-raw" computation? This is a bit fuzzy from my pov)?
Also, Russell's point of view would be appreciated, as is his input/efforts in general + this thread, and his paper that presents clearly and accessibly MGA, are, which hopefully goes without saying. Respects and complements, regardless of these quibbles. If you have no time, Russell; no worries, just minor concern to continue the exchange. Cue the military march music of stoicism, with hyper grave quality: We can never get to the bottom of these things.. nor would we wish to! Who says "it's at the bottom" anyway? Maybe "it's upstairs". My fridge certainly, truly, UD* or some alternate weirdness approved, just* is upstairs*. The fridge is true. And so is a slice of cheese. And yes, I kid. :-) PGC On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 2:27 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/19/2014 4:44 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 20 August 2014 04:16, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> If your altered state of consciousness has no self-awareness, is it >> still "consciousness"? And there's self-consciousness, i.e. being aware >> you are thinking. So it's not 'fading' qualia, it different categories of >> consciousness. I'd say my dog has self-awareness, e.g. he knows his name. >> But I'm not so sure he is self-conscious. The koi in my pond are aware, but >> I doubt they are self-aware. >> > > So this is all that Brent means by degrees of consciousness, > > > No, there might also be other differences, although Bruno would no doubt > disagree. Consider my example of the autonomous Mars Rover, suppose that > instead of summarizing things into a narrative memory and then > reconstructing remembered events, as people seem to, it simply recorded > everything and played back segments when it remembered. ISTM this might > make a difference in kind. Or suppose there were many Mars Rover at > different locations and were controlled by the same program. They would > have different kind of sense of location. > > > after all the waving it in everyone's faces as though it had huge > explanatory power, it's now been reduced to whether or not an organism > knows certain things about itself. This looks to me like a lot of > backpedalling on what started out as a rather grandiose concept, > > > Why would different kinds of consciousness be a grandiose concept? > > > but which has now ended up as something fairly trivial. So koi carp > don't have a concept of self (who would have thought it? What fools you've > been in the all-or-nothing camp not to realise that!) > > But it now appears that Brent just stepped out of the "consciousness > continuum" camp (from thermostats, according to Dan Dennet, to us) and into > the "either-conscious-or-not" camp. Is someone going to welcome him? > > > Bruno thinks there's a good chance the algae in my pond is conscious, so > he probably agrees that my thermostat might be too. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
