On 25 Aug 2014, at 05:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2014 6:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 August 2014 08:43, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
That's because Bruno rejects the link between 1) and 2) and takes
computation to exist in Platonia, independent of physics. So of
course with that assumption physics needs to either be explained
from computation (Bruno's program) or have it's own dualist basis.
I'm not so sure Platonia exists. Look up the old archive debates
between Bruno and Peter Jones.
If I understand Bruno's arguement correctly, that isn't an
assumption, it's a deduction. He assumes physical and classical
computation until he gets to the MGA, which apparently shows that
we have to reject the assumption of physical computation, although
I still don't really understand how (and all the talk of
counterfactuals hasn't helped, as yet, unfortunately).
The whole comp programme may of course be scuppered if
consciousness requires quantum computation and the existence of a
multiverse. Or it may not, since quantum computation (apparently)
only speeds up classical computation. Alternatively, if a
multiverse is necessary, then maybe that shows that consciousness
is a larger phenomenon than is dreamt of, even in Bruno's
philosophy, and we experience only a tiny sliver of it, at least
in this universe?
I think the idea is that quantum randomness is just first-person-
indeterminancy relative to the universes of the multiverse.
That would prevent to extract physics from arithmetic, and to test
computationalism.
It is instead that quantum randomness is just first-person-
indeterminacy relative to all universal numbers, or to arithmetic.
The quantum, and more generally the physical, is explained by
arithmetic and self)reference, without assuming anything physical.
The holographic principle would imply that the information content
of any universe is always finite. If there are infinitely many
universes (per eternal inflation) then there would be infinitely
many copies of distinct universe. Or invoking Leibniz's identity of
indiscernibles there would be finitely many distinct universes, but
the number of those that are expanding would increase without
bound. So that would all be consistent with "comp".
OK. (up to some nuances which would need more technical stuff, so I
will not argue on this here).
Bruno
Brent
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