Sorry for commenting this late.
On 25 Aug 2014, at 03:21, LizR wrote:
On 25 August 2014 08:43, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
That's because Bruno rejects the link between 1) and 2) and takes
computation to exist in Platonia, independent of physics. So of
course with that assumption physics needs to either be explained
from computation (Bruno's program) or have it's own dualist basis.
I'm not so sure Platonia exists. Look up the old archive debates
between Bruno and Peter Jones.
If I understand Bruno's arguement correctly, that isn't an
assumption, it's a deduction.
Exact.
He assumes physical and classical computation until he gets to the
MGA, which apparently shows that we have to reject the assumption of
physical computation, although I still don't really understand how
(and all the talk of counterfactuals hasn't helped, as yet,
unfortunately).
The problem is that there is no definition of physical computation
which does not use the arithmetical notion of computation. The MGA
shows that by adding "physically real" we lost comp, and put as much
magic in the physical than by saying "God decided it".
The whole comp programme may of course be scuppered if consciousness
requires quantum computation and the existence of a multiverse.
Just recently I found a subtle argument for this, but keep in mind
that quantum computations are done in classical arithmetic, so the
multiverse is still a projected partial view of the man-dreams in
arithmetic. So if we really require a physical multiverse, we do put a
non Turing emulable primitive matter in both physics and
computationalism, and this just to avoid a consequence of
computationalism. It is the "god-exoplanation" move, invalid in
science (including theology).
Or it may not, since quantum computation (apparently) only speeds up
classical computation.
Yes.
Alternatively, if a multiverse is necessary, then maybe that shows
that consciousness is a larger phenomenon than is dreamt of, even in
Bruno's philosophy, and we experience only a tiny sliver of it, at
least in this universe?
You mean "bruno's theorem". I don't defend philosophical ideas. I just
derive from assumptions, and Occam, like we always need to do in
applied science. Also, the multiverse is in arithmetic (in different
sense), so requiring a primitively material multiverse for
consciousness would made consciousness narrower than the comp
conception of it, not larger. Consciousness is related to all
universal numbers, not just the quantum universal numbers, which
abounds in arithmetic. The problem is indeed that consciousness with
comp might be to large, and then my point is a theorem showing that
this is testable (and thus science, not philosophy, unless you use the
term philosophy in the sense of testable philosophy, like Bell and
Schimony did).
Bruno
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