On 19 Sep 2014, at 02:46, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 06:05:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Self-aware means "aware of your self".
Hmm... It is a bit ambiguous, because that awareness can be
implicit, like I assume for the consciousness of a worm, or
explicit, which I assume for more complex animals.
How do you distinguish awareness from self-awareness?
Presumably, it is possible to be aware of something, without being
aware of a self. I imagine Casper the ghost would feel like that!
I think we agree on that.
More realistically, it is possible not to be aware of one's own
body. Dogs chasing their tails comes to mind - but that situation is
complicated, as sometimes they might do it for play, but be quite
aware that it's their own tail they're chasing. Animals that fight
their own images in a mirror are to some extent not self-aware,
although presumably that have a working proprioception system, which
is a kind of self-awareness (assuming they are aware to start with).
OK. They can be aware, and not self aware. The mirror test is good,
but is slightly too much for boring technical reason (when you
translate all this in arithmetical relations and sets). It could be
equivalent? As you know I associate an abstract person already to RA,
it has some raw consciousness, and more freedom than the poor PA,
which developed the belief in the induction axioms: For any
arithmetical property P (computable or not)
[P(0) & An(P(n) -> P(n + 1))] -> AnP(n)
This makes the "[]p -> [][]p" provable. It makes more generally p ->
[]p for all sigma_1 p ([] is sigma_1).
This makes the machine Löbian, and it has self-consciousness, and the
"shizophrenia" due to it self spliiting in the 8 different points of
view (the truth, the understandable, the knowable, the observable, the
feelable). 3 splits again making the eight one, but it is really 4 +
4*infinity, as the materials are graded).
One could say self-conscious as being "conscious of your self",
except
that I don't think there is any distinction in meaning between
awareness and consciousness.
BTW - conceptually, I don't see any inherent reason why a self is
needed just to be aware (or conscious), except that a self is a
bloody
useful thing, evolutionarily speaking - helps the immune system stop
parasites and pathogens, for example - also helps you stop injuring
your body (see what happens to people who lose their sense of touch,
or their proprioception or nociception (pain)).
The 3p self is the body, or the Gödel number of that body. It is
what the doctor will put on the hard disk, and a program can refer
to itself in that sense through the Dx = "xx" method. It is captured
by the modal box of the modal logic of self-reference. That self is
not "conscious". It can only manifest your 1p-self (closer to
consciousness) when in company of God (truth). But then it lost his
name, and is not really a machine.
I address this in the paper.
But my comment sum up where I disagree. I will comment more
precisely when I have more times.
What you go on to say that consciousness
C (ie the consciousness attached to body C, which is in B)
supervenes
on B+A, which is correct.
OK, so you agree that Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice's
body + Bob's body + the room + the entire universe + the entire
UD*.
OK?
But my point is that consciousness itself
(not necessarily attached to a particular body or person)
You mean the existence of consciousness?
is not
supervenient on B+A in this case, as the consciousness could
be a C or
a D (where D supervenes on A).
?
I agree, (assuming always some neuro-assumption to make things
simple) that Alice's consciousness does not supervene on Bob's
brain
activity, but it does supervenes on Alice + Bob brains activities.
Where this matters is that one cannot say consciousness
supervenes on
the universal dovetailer.
I really don't see this. That contradict the fact that if A
supervenes on B, it supervenes on A+B.
If Alice consciousness supervenes on say one computation in the
UD*,
it supervenes on that computation + all the others.
The computation here is the UD. If Alice experiences a different
thought, then the UD does not change, as the UD calculates that
experience too. Consequently, Alice's consciousness cannot supervene
on the UD itself. Only on some computations that the UD executes.
To change Alice consciousness "here and now" you need to change the
UD*.
What does "here and now" even mean in this context?
Something admittedly foolish. It is a bit like asking God to change
arithmetic so that I suppress the happening of some experience to me.
"Here and now" was just to make precise that I was talking about
precise conscious experience, and not some concept of consciousness.
The fact that is is impossible does not change the fact that Alice
consciousness supervenes on the UD*.
This statement is inconsistent.
You are right, I expressed myself badly.
Assuming COMP, of course.
Of course, and some high level of substitution.
Actually, no, this is not required. But let's continue.
Well, it helps. If some object in the room, or the galaxy where
required, we would need to take this explicitly in the reasoning. That
is not fatal, for the conclusion of the reasoning, as we can just have
to redo the experience at the lower level, where Alice's consciousness
is incarnated by the Higgs bosons in a sphere centred on Alice's stem,
and engulfing the galaxy, but that would make the talk much longer.
Maybe the classroom analogy is not clearly enough expressed, because
you still say Alice's consciousness, not consciousness (in general)
What is "consciousness (in general)"? Is it the existence of
consciousness?
No - I distinguish that case. I can't remember whether I left it in
the MGA paper, or deleted it because it just confused the the main
point of the paper. Consciousness has a state (which we call the
observer moment).
Hmm... I don't really believe in "observer moment", except for the 3p-
relative computational state. But the 1p-observer moment is what is
structured by some semantics for the 1p person logic, that is, the
logic of S4Grz, identifying the first person with "the knower".
If that state differs, then the state of the
supervened must also differ.
Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't change
for a change of state of consciousness.
OK. I thought you where asking about the existence of consciousness
which "can" be explained by the machine in term of what they know to
be true for them, but knows also that they cannot prove it to us.
In this case I would say something like
"consciousness in general supervenes on computations and truth".
Consciousness is first person. It is more related to some "[]p & p"
or "[]p & <>p" (& p), than to any 3p "[]p".
Even for p sigma_1 (even on p sigma_0) we don't have, from the
machine's point of view, that p <-> []p. We do have p -> []p, but
the reciprocal []p -> p is only true in G* minus G, so machines
can't believe in it "rationally", only guess it instinctively, and
with the development of self-reflexion, this will look weird for
her. The conjunction with truth makes consciousness, awareness,
knowledge, into non propositional attitudes. Most of the machine's
first person knowledge is non representational. It is not in the
brain, it is in the relation between the brain and the whole
(sigma_1, or more) truth.
OK :)
Bruno
Bruno
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
