On 25 Sep 2014, at 20:41, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 , Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> Your clearly ignore the entire field of philosophy of mind.
You almost make that sound like a bad thing.
You might get help by reading some book, like Kim on supervenience, or
Tye's book on "8 problems about consciousness".
Bit the *way* you are stuck in step 3 makes me think that you have
your religion about all this, and that you are not really open to
think about that type of problem.
> Not all analog machine can be computable,
Yes some things are not computable. Turing proved that not all
numbers are computable,
I guess you mean "real number". It is better to stick on the function
from N to N, and talk about non computable function. The real are then
(from a logician point of view) the *total* computable functions,
which are not recursively enumerable, despite the (partial) computable
functions from N to N are.
(I know Turing used the real number in its seminal paper).
in fact nearly all numbers are not computable; such is the nature of
infinite sets that if you picked a point at random on the real
number line
Not sure I can do that. (But I see what you mean).
there is a 100% chance it will be non computable. However except for
random number generators every analog machine human beings have ever
made is computable.
Not sure about that. I read that soap bubbles in some lattice can
generate non computable surface "theoretically" at least. OK, I am not
sure if we have been able to generate analogically a non computable
surface since then.
And not only that but the fundamental laws of physics tell us that
every machine we or anybody or anything else will ever build will
also be computable.
Again, that is not so easy, because nature might exploits real
numbers, and there is no real Church thesis for computablity in
analysis.
I agree with your argument as giving evidence for comp (=
computationalism), but not as proving it in any sense.
So when you say "not all analog machines are computable" what you
really mean is "analog machines that can't be built can't be
computed".
They can't be build, but that might not be easy. Like a true random
generator. It is easy, using some qubits, but it remains very hard to
get it in practice.
> the litterature offers many ways to provide counter-example to comp
You invented the "Comp" word, "the literature" has no idea what
"Comp" means and neither do I.
You have understood step 0-1-2. So if you understand english, you
should understand that comp is just computationalism, in a more
precise but conceptually very weak form.
> we have to exchange Aristotle conception of reality for the one by
Plato.
The idea that somebody who died 2500 years ago can help us with
answering cutting edge scientific questions of today is ridiculous.
If you say so.
>> Nobody needs to assume computationalism because we already know
for a fact that it's true,
> God told you so?
No.
Then you do very bad science and/or bad religion. You pretend to know
the truth.
> It looks more like physicalism, which is indeed often confused
with mechanism
And who caused that confusion? Philosophers of mind. They invented
the word "physicalism" and the definition they gave it is
"everything is physical" which gives me precisely as much
information as saying "everything is klogknee", that is to say zero.
Meaning needs contrast, "everything is physical" is equivalent to
"nothing is physical"
Well, it is opposed with "Everything is arithmetical".
We have evidence that we can reduce biology to chemistry, and
chemistry to physics. I just provided an argument that if we take
computationalism seriously enough, we can understand that a part of
the mind-body problem is reduce into a reducion of physics to
arithmetic (including meta-arithmetic, which helps to explain why
there are unobservable truth, like consciousness and understanding of
numbers).
> I could have just ask you what you mean by "matter".
I have 2 answers to that, they both work, take your pick:
1) Fermions and Bosons.
2) Everything except for information.
> From an apparent correlation between mind and brain activity, [...]
If it goes both ways then it's more than a correlation and that's
what we've got in this case. Change the brain and the mind always
changes. Change the mind and the brain always changes. And that is
why nobody needs to assume computationalism (not to be confused with
"comp") because we already know for a fact that it's true.
At which substitution level?
The problem with computationalism, is that it needs to assume some
level of description, to encapsulate the finiteness of information
content of the teleportation beam. So comp truncates the person, and
the person will be indeterminate from her point of view on all
(re)incarnation of that truncated computational states in the physical
universe, and indeed even in the arithmetical reality, given that the
universal machine cannot distinguish it immediately from a "physical"
reality. You seem to invent some primitive matter to do the selection,
but how can it do without introducing actual infinities?
Bruno
Bruno
John K Clark
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