On 23 Sep 2014, at 16:20, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Matter is a possible means to implement universal machine. That is
of course in need to be explained when we assume comp.
And this is a example of why I'm so certain that regardless of what
you say "comp" is NOT just a abbreviation for computationalism.
Computationalism says that consciousness is what matter does when it
is organized in certain ways and we could prove that proposition the
same way we could prove any 2 things are equivalent.
Your clearly ignore the entire field of philosophy of mind.
Putnam 1960 is at the origin of the name "functionalism" which is
basically the idea that the brain is a Turing machine. Note that all
Turing machines are finite object. The universal machine are finite
object too.
My own definition is a weakening of Putnam's definition. The brain is
only assumed to be Turing emulable at some level of description.
Not all analog machine can be computable, and the litterature offers
many ways to provide counter-example to comp (infinite machines,
computable function with non computable derivative, ...). There are
nuance here based on different realtion we can make between the
computable function from N to N (which admit a clean mathematical
definition, even arithmetical, in fact which admit a Church-thesis)
with the computable functions from R to R, which have no Church
Thesis, no universal machine, except for some of the definitions used
on which there is no agreement. But computationalism here and
elsewhere refer to the computable functions from N to N. That is why
people call it also "digital mechanism", or simply "mechanism".
Weak materialist, that is those believing in a primary ontological
matter, are usually mechanist, and believes that the body and the
brain are some natural *machinery*, and indeed very good logician and
philosopher of mathematics identifies, a bit like you, materialism (=
weak materialist + there is no soul, and thus = monistt materialist)
use mechanism (and/or digital mechanism) as a way to stop reflection
on mind, but usually they just ignore computer science which, once
comp is assumed *is* the start of a theory of mind. Except that
computer science can be embedded in arithmetic, for the theory, and
even arguably its semantics can be embedded in second-order arithmetic
(that is not yet completely clear to me).
Then what I explain is that if the brain is Turing emulable, matter
has to be given by the winning histories (computation + a notion of
points of view) indeterminate on all sigma_1 truth (which is
computable).
When we change the ways the neurons in our brain operate (through
chemicals or electricity or physical movement etc) our consciousness
changes, AND when our consciousness changes we also note that the
way our neurons work changes.
This does not decide if the changes are Turing emulable or not.
With Everett QM, we have already the look of the comp supervenience,
where your consciousness is distributed on all the infinite relevant
terms of the universal wave, or the relevant state in the universal
deployment.
The relations that you describe are locally correct, but their nature
and origin can differ, and indeed I argue that if comp is correct,
then they have to be statistical.
Therefore nobody needs to assume computationalism because we already
know for a fact that it's true,
God told you so?
and yet you constantly tell us that we must "assume comp" therefore
despite your protests to the contrary I must conclude that whatever
"comp" means it's not computationalism.
Your definition does not involve the notion of machine or computation.
It looks more like physicalism, which is indeed often confused with
mechanism, because few are aware that computationalism is incompatible
with physicalism.
You seem to assume a primitive physical universe. I could have just
ask you what you mean by "matter".
Yes, you can see the result like showing that the two old allies
Materialism and Mechanism have to divorce, if we take them seriously
enough.
Nothing personal but when you say one thing and logic says something
else I must side with logic.
You try, but you don't side enough with logic, and you ignore the
literature. From an apparent correlation between mind and brain
activity, you can't derive the existence of a brain and you can't
identify an 1p notion like consciousness with a 3p notion like a
brain. Even without computationalism, but with computationalism,
computer science explains constructively where the difficulties come
from, and even why machines can be aware of them, but in passing we
have to exchange Aristotle conception of reality for the one by Plato.
That does not change locally much of science and religion besides the
new modesty, but it changes the meaning of all words, and enlarge the
perspective, I think. the laws of physics get an arithmetical
explanation, and we understand why some physical relation can hurt,
and why that is hard to prove.
Bruno
John K Clark
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