On 24 Sep 2014, at 00:36, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 04:57:20PM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-09-23 16:20 GMT+02:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
And this is a example of why I'm so certain that regardless of
what you
say "comp" is NOT just a abbreviation for computationalism.
Computationalism says that consciousness is what matter does when
it is
organized in certain ways
No, that's not computationalism... that's functionalism.
Computationalism
involve computations... Consciousness could come from matter
organized in
certain ways without being the result of a computation. So no,
computationalism is not "consciousness is what matter does when it is
organized in certain ways".
Quentin
If I might comment: this is usually called materialism, and it is
basically the idea that consciousness supervenes on matter.
There is a more extreme version of materialism called physicalism,
which essentially states that consciousness is nothing more than an
epiphenomenon, that physical processes and relationships suffice to
fully and completely explain everything. Physicalism sometimes goes by
the name of eliminative materialism. And IIUC, physicalism is what
Bruno shows is incompatible with COMP, materialism as I use it here is
perfectly compatible.
I agree, and as our bodies supervenes on the infinities of
computations below our level (and structured by the points of view)
our human consciousness can reasonable be said to supervene on the
activity of matter. That is even why we are delude on matter and
compulsed to take it as primitive.
Now since John argues that consciousness has real world consequences
in terms of being evolutionary selected, this would make him a
materialist, but not physicalist.
Except that it miss the digital, which eventually forces us to extend
the first person state facts from the universal wave or the universal
unitary transform to the statistic on all sigma_1 sentences.
But as I note in my book, every philosopher of the mind uses these
labels in slightly different, and at times contradictory ways. It is a
woolly mess, to be sure.
This comes in part on the confusion between materialism and mechanism,
which actually oppose themselves, in a way similar to the opposition
between Plato and Aristotle, or mathematicalism and physicalism.
It guess it is more easy for a materialist to mock the fairy tales
than to mock computer science and the existence of a canonical net of
computations/dreams in arithmetic. Then this can be tested, because
everything is well defined, and it is a problem in (meta) arithmetic.
The propositional part of physics has been tested.
Why electron? Why quark? Interesting question, but we are still at
"why linear?, why 3p symmetrical?, why 1p antisymmetrical locally?, etc.
I think that the finite simple groups can play some role, even the
number 24, to make the comp "particles" physics quasi-identical with
what the physicist should infer from the marriage of QM and GR.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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