On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 7:09 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 9/26/2014 1:14 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 03:17:07AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 1:03 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected] >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Well done for being obtuse! The platonically malleable urstuff is >>>> usually taken to be integer arithmetic, although any system capable of >>>> universal computation will do, such as Bruno's combinators >>>> example. >>>> >>> >>> You appear to be making the dog chase its tail. >>> >> ? >> >> >>> But conscious does not supervene on that, for the reasons >>>> given in my paper, but rather on sheaves of computations that make it >>>> up, by assumption of COMP. >>>> >>> >>> Not in your sense of requiring physical, concrete realizations: why do we >>> need those? >>> >> We don't, if by "concrete" you mean what Bruno means by it. >> >> What are they and how do we avoid attributing originality to >>> all your doppelgangers distributed in UD if such is given? >>> >>> originality? >> >> It also must supervene on the emergent >>>> phenomenal physics that arises. That is a raw empirical fact that no >>>> pussy-footing around can eliminate. >>>> >>> The MGA demonstrates the >>> >>>> fundamental contradiction between COMP and physical supervenience in a >>>> non-robust universe, consequently the only way to save COMP is for the >>>> universe to be robust. >>>> >>>> You pretend that this is common sense. That's much less clear to me. >>> >>> This stuff is far from common sense. It is a simple matter of logic, >> however. >> >> If you accept the empirical fact of physical supervenience (as I do, >> and indeed also have arguments for why it must be so - see the Occam >> Catastrophe discussion in my book), then the fact that the MGA forces >> a contradiction between physical supervenience and computational >> supervenience in a non-robust universe really just says there is a >> choice: either we live in a robust universe, or computationalism is >> false. The fact that we additionally observe quantum phenomena really >> supports the idea we live in a robust universe. In a non-robust >> universe, quantum phenomena is just weird. >> >> Additionally, in a robust universe, the Church-Turing thesis tells us >> that physics we supervene on must be emergent from the properties of >> universal systems (Bruno's reversal result). Thus the matter we supervene >> on cannot be "primitive". The primitive urstuff is something else >> entirely - the arithmetic of integers, perhaps, as Bruno suggests - >> but not matter as we know it. >> > > I think I agree with you (see further query's below). But it's not > entirely clear why matter cannot be primitive. It's not clear because > "matter" isn't defined (as Bruno likes to point out when criticizing what > he calls "Aristotelianism"). I think your point is that naively conceived > matter isn't complex enough to avoid the reductio's like the MGA. But at > PGC intuites quantum "matter" may well be. Lots of physicists have already > observed that the "matter" they talk about has become so abstract it's hard > to say how it differs from mathematical objects. > > >> You may think robust universes are baroque, but I don't. Infinite, >>>> symmetrical ensembles of universes are simpler from an information >>>> theoretic perspective than specific finite instances. This is >>>> ultimately the strongest argument in favour of platonism. >>>> >>>> But there is a sense that nature doesn't have to play by our >>>> rules. Maybe we really do live in a non-robust universe. If so, we >>>> cannot have our COMP and eat it. >>>> >>>> I don't see how stating that UD (straight, not shaken or stirred with >>> Quantum computer material stuff actualizing) is too cumbersome to realize >>> physically wherever it is that we are, >>> >> ie assuming non-robustness (which IMHO is virtually equivalent to >> assuming ultrafinitism - like Norm Wildberger's position). >> >> gives you convincing leverage >> >>> concerning consciousness relating to experiential outcome of some A/B >>> experiment, as the relation of selection is invariant for delays and >>> locations of reconstitution. >>> >>> It demonstrates an inconsistency between physical supervenience and >> computational supervenience, notably that physical supervenience >> entails that certain very simple computations, such as the replaying >> of a recording, will be conscious. >> >> This only works in a non-robust universe, however, a point that is >> often overlooked in treatments of this. >> > > So are you agreeing with my point that the world (being quantum) is so > complex that to take all the counterfactuals into account in the MGA > requires creating a whole simulated universe in which the "playback" > occurs, thus vitiating the reductio? > > Brent > I thought you taught me that Special Relativity provides playback as well as prediction, reference-frame dependent. Richard > > >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
