On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 6:53 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 9/23/2014 5:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
> If I might comment: this is usually called materialism, and it is
>> basically the idea that consciousness supervenes on matter.
>>
>> There is a more extreme version of materialism called physicalism,
>> which essentially states that consciousness is nothing more than an
>> epiphenomenon, that physical processes and relationships suffice to
>> fully and completely explain everything. Physicalism sometimes goes by
>> the name of eliminative materialism. And IIUC, physicalism is what
>> Bruno shows is incompatible with COMP, materialism as I use it here is
>> perfectly compatible.
>>
>
> Which I don't see. In both cases it would appear that one needs to keep
> matter primitive, which comp along UDA and machine interview lines does
> not, gradually letting go of it in steps 6,7,8.
>
> I don't see why with comp specified we'd need some primitive matter, which
> you appear to assume ("matter organized certain ways... consciousness
> supervenes" )nor do I see convincing attempt of wrestling with "matter is
> any snot I need it to be for argument's sake".
>
> Where I agree with you is that the subject is a mess; where I perhaps
> disagree is that I'm not sure you're part of the cleanup crew, especially
> with the vague matter you appear to be shlepping around. Could you clarify
> this? PGC
>
>
> I agree with Russell, matter organized in certain ways is necessary for
> consciousness (as we know it. For *not* as we know it...well, we don't know).
> However, neither Russell nor I said "primitive" matter. That was inserted
> by you - thus muddling the muddle of which you complain.
>
It is implied by Russell's statement "materialism is perfectly compatible
with comp", which I still don't see. "Organized in certain ways" denotes
function of some sort, so one appears to need platonia, machines/notion of
function with Russell's version of "comp"... while consciousness supervenes
on matter is pulled out of the hat, which I would like explained as we seem
to have left the comp frame Russell is asserting we are still in.
"Perfectly compatible" I'd like to see, and what role matter plays as
apparently "platonically malleable" urstuff on par with its "organization",
without flight into the transparent "everything is everything" position,
for which we always can use cleanup crews.
I'd like to see this clarified, and indeed if this clarifies anything...
letting matter organized by Plato into the thing means infinities of
primitives (this permits matter to be organized in infinite ways), without
clarifying why this is needed or what it clarifies about properties of
matter. Unless there is some insight into matter from which say
"organization" can be explained for example. So the muddle ball is back
your court with Russell. PGC
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