On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 04:47:08PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 6:53 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 9/23/2014 5:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > > Which I don't see. In both cases it would appear that one needs to keep > > matter primitive, which comp along UDA and machine interview lines does > > not, gradually letting go of it in steps 6,7,8. > > > > I don't see why with comp specified we'd need some primitive matter, which > > you appear to assume ("matter organized certain ways... consciousness > > supervenes" )nor do I see convincing attempt of wrestling with "matter is > > any snot I need it to be for argument's sake". > > > > Where I agree with you is that the subject is a mess; where I perhaps > > disagree is that I'm not sure you're part of the cleanup crew, especially > > with the vague matter you appear to be shlepping around. Could you clarify > > this? PGC > > > > > > I agree with Russell, matter organized in certain ways is necessary for > > consciousness (as we know it. For *not* as we know it...well, we don't > > know). > > However, neither Russell nor I said "primitive" matter. That was inserted > > by you - thus muddling the muddle of which you complain. > > > > It is implied by Russell's statement "materialism is perfectly compatible > with comp", which I still don't see. "Organized in certain ways" denotes > function of some sort, so one appears to need platonia, machines/notion of > function with Russell's version of "comp"... while consciousness supervenes > on matter is pulled out of the hat, which I would like explained as we seem > to have left the comp frame Russell is asserting we are still in.
Materialism just means consciousness supervenes on matter. This is Chalmers' definition, and is how I use the word. We've been over this many times - the UDA does not rule out physical supervenience. If it did, it would be so much the worse for COMP. What the UDA does rule out is physicalism, the notion that the physical reality is all there is. Bruno's "primitive matter" is just physicalism. Some people seem to conflate materialism with physicalism - Michael Lockwood is one, for instance, but I'd prefer to distinguish them like Chalmers does. The MGA does drive a contradictio between physical supervenience and COMP, but the point of my paper which started this thread is that the MGA only works in a non-robust universe. Thus COMP is perfectly compatible with materialism in a robust universe. > > "Perfectly compatible" I'd like to see, and what role matter plays as > apparently "platonically malleable" urstuff on par with its "organization", > without flight into the transparent "everything is everything" position, > for which we always can use cleanup crews. > Matter is most definitely not '"platonically malleable" urstuff'. That is not what is meant by conscious supervenes on matter. Again - see my paper for the explanation. > I'd like to see this clarified, and indeed if this clarifies anything... > letting matter organized by Plato into the thing means infinities of > primitives (this permits matter to be organized in infinite ways), without > clarifying why this is needed or what it clarifies about properties of > matter. Unless there is some insight into matter from which say > "organization" can be explained for example. So the muddle ball is back > your court with Russell. PGC > The only "muddle" I see is the conflation of materialism and physicalism. It doesn't help that Bruno uses MAT to describe both positions in his thesis, but we have clarified that point a number of times. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
