On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 1:18 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 04:47:08PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > It is implied by Russell's statement "materialism is perfectly compatible > > with comp", which I still don't see. "Organized in certain ways" denotes > > function of some sort, so one appears to need platonia, machines/notion > of > > function with Russell's version of "comp"... while consciousness > supervenes > > on matter is pulled out of the hat, which I would like explained as we > seem > > to have left the comp frame Russell is asserting we are still in. > > Materialism just means consciousness supervenes on matter. This is > Chalmers' definition, and is how I use the word. We've been over this > many times - the UDA does not rule out physical supervenience. If it > did, it would be so much the worse for COMP. > > What the UDA does rule out is physicalism, the notion that the physical > reality is all there is. > > Bruno's "primitive matter" is just physicalism. Some people seem to > conflate materialism with physicalism - Michael Lockwood is one, for > instance, but I'd prefer to distinguish them like Chalmers does. > > The MGA does drive a contradictio between physical supervenience and > COMP, but the point of my paper which started this thread is that the > MGA only works in a non-robust universe. Thus COMP is perfectly > compatible with materialism in a robust universe. > Where you still require the complete integral realization of the UD, robust time and space in causal/historical relations, that each have to be accounted for and explained themselves: stating "physical quantum computer multiverse" doesn't clarify the extravagant, as Bruno put it, weirdness of "flipping the switch" consciousness relation to matter. To be short: the physical realization part of computation for counterfactual correctness of diverging branch is the baroque thing that bothers me. I don't see the need or what is gained/clarified as such. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
