On 10/8/2014 5:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 2:50 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 10/8/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 07 Oct 2014, at 20:17, meekerdb wrote:

    On 10/7/2014 1:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 06 Oct 2014, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:

    Here's an interesting interview of a philosopher who is interested in the
    question of whether God exists.  The interesting thing about it, for this 
list,
    is that "God" is implicitly the god of theism, and is not "one's reason for
    existence" or "the unprovable truths of arithmetic".

How do you know that? How could you know that.

    I read the interview.  For example

    /D.G.: I’m not a believer, so I’m not in a position to say. First of all, 
it’s
    worth noting that some of the biggest empirical challenges don’t come from 
science
    but from common features of life. Perhaps the hardest case for believers is 
the
    Problem of Evil: The question of how a benevolent God could allow the 
existence of
    evil in the world, both natural evils like devastating earthquakes and 
human evils
    like the Holocaust, has always been a great challenge to faith in God. 
There is,
    of course, a long history of responses to that problem that goes back to 
Job.
    While nonbelievers (like me) consider this a major problem, believers have, 
for
    the most part, figured out how to accommodate themselves to it./

    It's obvious that Garber is talking about the god of theism.  If he were 
referring
    to some abstract principle or set of unprovable truths there would be no 
"problem
    of evil" for that god.


    On the contrary, computationalism will relate qualia like pain and evil 
related
    things with what numbers can endure in a fist person perspective yet 
understand
    that this enduring is ineffable and hard to justify and be confronted with 
that
    very problem.

    But under computationlism it's not a problem. The is no presumption that a
    computable world is morally good by human standards.


Under computationalism, all possible worlds and all possible observers exist and there's nothing God can do about it. God can no more make certain observers or observations not exist than make 2 + 2 = 3. However, a benevolent theistic god under computationalism (with access to unlimited computing resources) could nonetheless "save" beings who existed in other worlds by continuing the computation of their minds.

You say "could" as though he had a choice, meaning He's not part of the computable world and is not one of the "all possible observers". Seems to me that he will have to both save everyone and also torture everyone in hell.

Brent

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