On 08 Oct 2014, at 21:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/8/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2014, at 20:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2014 1:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2014, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
Here's an interesting interview of a philosopher who is
interested in the question of whether God exists. The
interesting thing about it, for this list, is that "God" is
implicitly the god of theism, and is not "one's reason for
existence" or "the unprovable truths of arithmetic".
How do you know that? How could you know that.
I read the interview. For example
D.G.: I'm not a believer, so I'm not in a position to say. First
of all, it's worth noting that some of the biggest empirical
challenges don't come from science but from common features of
life. Perhaps the hardest case for believers is the
Problem of Evil: The question of how a benevolent God could allow
the existence of evil in the world, both natural
evils like devastating earthquakes and human evils like the
Holocaust, has always been a great challenge to faith in God.
There is, of course, a long history of responses to that problem
that goes back to Job. While nonbelievers (like me) consider this
a major problem, believers have, for the most part, figured out
how to accommodate themselves to it.
It's obvious that Garber is talking about the god of theism. If
he were referring to some abstract principle or set of unprovable
truths there would be no "problem of evil" for that god.
On the contrary, computationalism will relate qualia like pain and
evil related things with what numbers can endure in a fist person
perspective yet understand that this enduring is ineffable and hard
to justify and be confronted with that very problem.
But under computationlism it's not a problem. The is no presumption
that a computable world is morally good by human standards.
We can ask the universal person, but good, like truth can't be
defined, although there might be approximations. It is not easy.
There is indeed no presumption on this, nor attempt to wishful
thinking, but the question of pains, hell, all that is still open,
even for a physicalist. Even for the case of the ideally correct
machine.
Bruno
Brent
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