[SPK] I have a suspicion as to how this might happen. I think that it may be > evidence of part of Bruno's argument that we are not single computations. > > If our individual minds span over all of the brains that could > implement them and each brain is tied into a single physical world, then so > long as the "wipe" occurs only in some some of the physical worlds, then it > is possible to "retain the memory". > This implies a restricted form of computational universality - not all > software can "run" on each and every piece of hardware - and that there may > be a way of selecting what the software does by steering which hardware it > is available to run on. In this way one can "control" the software without > taking any direct action on it. >
[Telmo] Interesting, I hope Bruno can comment on this. [Bruno] I am not sure I understand. By Church thesis all software can run on all hardware or anything, once it is organized so that it is Turing Universal. Then the distinction between hardware and software is relative above the substitution level, and absolute below (matter emerging from the FPI sums on infinities of computations). I think that Stephen might be valid, though. If we were able to kill ourself mentally and instantaneously, we might choose the selection, like in a WM duplication but when seeing Moscow (and the temperature) you kill yourself, so that only the W-guy survives. But nature has programmed in a way such that we can't easily do that, at least in the "mundane state of consciousness". Near death or in altered consciousness state, I don't know. Perhaps. This needs much more research to figure out. Hi Bruno. You are taking a Platonic view and tracing out all distinctions of computations (modulo complexity class) and hardware (modulo resource availability), otherwise I thing we agree. On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 16 Oct 2014, at 16:48, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Stephen Paul King < > stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: > >> Hi Telmo, >> >> You wrote: "If I understand the ideas in Mitra's paper correctly, >> wouldn't it require that you yourself had forgotten about the discussion? >> " >> >> That is what I thought at first as well and concluded that it was just >> a misremembering or delusion. But I could not shake how "well constructed >> the memory is. It was as if my memories somehow survived while all >> objective traces vanished. All the non-1p traces had vanished but all of >> the 1p content was still there. >> > > Ok, that is quite intriguing. Have you tried asking your previous > interlocutors? Could you have dreamt it? > > I had some very vivid dreams when I was a kid that feel like real memories > to me. I only assume they are dreams because of the content (a plush toy > gaining life, being pushed out of a very tall building and things like > that). Looking back I suspect we are born into a very psychedelic state, > but that's another topic. > > I'm not trying to grill you. I find this really interesting so would like > to know the details. > > >> >> I have a suspicion as to how this might happen. I think that it may be >> evidence of part of Bruno's argument that we are not single computations. >> >> If our individual minds span over all of the brains that could >> implement them and each brain is tied into a single physical world, then so >> long as the "wipe" occurs only in some some of the physical worlds, then it >> is possible to "retain the memory". >> This implies a restricted form of computational universality - not all >> software can "run" on each and every piece of hardware - and that there may >> be a way of selecting what the software does by steering which hardware it >> is available to run on. In this way one can "control" the software without >> taking any direct action on it. >> > > Interesting, I hope Bruno can comment on this. > > > I am not sure I understand. By Church thesis all software can run on all > hardware or anything, once it is organized so that it is Turing Universal. > Then the distinction between hardware and software is relative above the > substitution level, and absolute below (matter emerging from the FPI sums > on infinities of computations). I think that Stephen might be valid, > though. If we were able to kill ourself mentally and instantaneously, we > might choose the selection, like in a WM duplication but when seeing Moscow > (and the temperature) you kill yourself, so that only the W-guy survives. > But nature has programmed in a way such that we can't easily do that, at > least in the "mundane state of consciousness". Near death or in altered > consciousness state, I don't know. Perhaps. This needs much more research > to figure out. > > > > So essentially the physical universe would be a type of consensus amongst > infinite instantiations of a mind? I guess your experience could be called > a "reverse déjà vu" or maybe a "jamais vu". > > > I ask we recount the votes! > > :) > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> This hypothesis makes sense to me as I am using a dualist ontology, >> minds and bodies are not one and the same "thing" or "process" - I reject >> Descartes' substance dualism - the isomorphism implied by the duality is >> not between individual minds (logical structures/algebras) and brains >> (topological spaces/groups), but between something more like quotient >> <http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/5104/quotienting-a-set-by-an-equivalence-relation-such-that-the-natural-projection-is> >> of adjoint categories <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functor_category>. >> >> I can't find a good mathematical description of the concept yet... >> >> On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:32 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 5:29 PM, Stephen Paul King < >>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Telmo, >>>> >>>> One event involved an email exchange that I has with two people. We >>>> where discussing theories of emergent space-time. Nothing really >>>> consequential. It didn't go anywhere as on of the persons said that I had >>>> to wait for his paper to be published for further information on his >>>> theory. >>>> Thing is, now the only evidence that I can find that the events >>>> happened are in my memory. All of the emails and so forth are gone, as if >>>> they where wiped clean from our reality. >>>> >>> >>> Thanks Stephen. >>> If I understand the ideas in Mitra's paper correctly, wouldn't it >>> require that you yourself had forgotten about the discussion? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 5:58 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Stephen, >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 8:53 PM, Stephen Paul King < >>>>> stephe...@charter.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Brent, >>>>>> >>>>>> I have had a couple of experiences that proved to me that there >>>>>> exists something like the theist God. Things that I can not explain >>>>>> otherwise are some kind of "divine intervention" that saved my life. >>>>>> Could >>>>>> there be an explanation that is completely secular? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Could it be explained by MWI + anthropic principle? You died in a >>>>> large number of branches, in the ones where you survived something very >>>>> unlikely necessarily happened? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I am open to such, but its like arguing that something like the >>>>>> spontaneous unscrambling of an egg actually happened but one does not >>>>>> have >>>>>> a collection of unimpeachable witnesses available. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ever you have an experience that is like Mitra's history rewrite >>>>>> idea http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825? I have! >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I love this idea and I bet on its validity. That being said, how can >>>>> you know you had such an experience? Could you elaborate? >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Telmo. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, October 6, 2014 2:15:44 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's an interesting interview of a philosopher who is interested >>>>>>> in the question of >>>>>>> whether God exists. The interesting thing about it, for this list, >>>>>>> is that "God" is >>>>>>> implicitly the god of theism, and is not "one's reason for >>>>>>> existence" or "the unprovable >>>>>>> truths of arithmetic". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -------- Original Message -------- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/can- >>>>>>> wanting-to-believe-make-us-believers/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gary Gutting: "This is the 12th and last in a series of interviews >>>>>>> about religion that I >>>>>>> am conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is >>>>>>> Daniel Garber, a >>>>>>> professor of philosophy at Princeton University, specializing in >>>>>>> philosophy and science in >>>>>>> the period of Galileo and Newton. In a week or two, I’ll conclude >>>>>>> with a wrap-up column on >>>>>>> the series." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Daniel Garber: "Certainly there are serious philosophers who would >>>>>>> deny that the arguments >>>>>>> for the existence of God have been decisively refuted. But even so, >>>>>>> my impression is that >>>>>>> proofs for the existence of God have ceased to be a matter of >>>>>>> serious discussion outside >>>>>>> of the domain of professional philosophy of religion. And even >>>>>>> there, my sense is that the >>>>>>> discussions are largely a matter of academic interest: The real >>>>>>> passion has gone out of >>>>>>> the question." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/uxC9vWWQ0Ss/unsubscribe >>>>> . >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Kindest Regards, >>>> >>>> Stephen Paul King >>>> >>>> Senior Researcher >>>> >>>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >>>> >>>> stephe...@provensecure.com >>>> >>>> http://www.provensecure.us/ >>>> >>>> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the >>>> use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain >>>> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and >>>> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >>>> attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are >>>> hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of >>>> this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this >>>> message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message >>>> immediately.” >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/uxC9vWWQ0Ss/unsubscribe >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Kindest Regards, >> >> Stephen Paul King >> >> Senior Researcher >> >> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >> >> stephe...@provensecure.com >> >> http://www.provensecure.us/ >> >> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use >> of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain >> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and >> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >> attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are >> hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of >> this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this >> message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message >> immediately.” >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/uxC9vWWQ0Ss/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
