On 16 Oct 2014, at 16:48, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Hi Telmo,
You wrote: "If I understand the ideas in Mitra's paper correctly,
wouldn't it require that you yourself had forgotten about the
discussion?"
That is what I thought at first as well and concluded that it was
just a misremembering or delusion. But I could not shake how "well
constructed the memory is. It was as if my memories somehow survived
while all objective traces vanished. All the non-1p traces had
vanished but all of the 1p content was still there.
Ok, that is quite intriguing. Have you tried asking your previous
interlocutors? Could you have dreamt it?
I had some very vivid dreams when I was a kid that feel like real
memories to me. I only assume they are dreams because of the content
(a plush toy gaining life, being pushed out of a very tall building
and things like that). Looking back I suspect we are born into a
very psychedelic state, but that's another topic.
I'm not trying to grill you. I find this really interesting so would
like to know the details.
I have a suspicion as to how this might happen. I think that it
may be evidence of part of Bruno's argument that we are not single
computations.
If our individual minds span over all of the brains that could
implement them and each brain is tied into a single physical world,
then so long as the "wipe" occurs only in some some of the physical
worlds, then it is possible to "retain the memory".
This implies a restricted form of computational universality -
not all software can "run" on each and every piece of hardware - and
that there may be a way of selecting what the software does by
steering which hardware it is available to run on. In this way one
can "control" the software without taking any direct action on it.
Interesting, I hope Bruno can comment on this.
I am not sure I understand. By Church thesis all software can run on
all hardware or anything, once it is organized so that it is Turing
Universal. Then the distinction between hardware and software is
relative above the substitution level, and absolute below (matter
emerging from the FPI sums on infinities of computations). I think
that Stephen might be valid, though. If we were able to kill ourself
mentally and instantaneously, we might choose the selection, like in a
WM duplication but when seeing Moscow (and the temperature) you kill
yourself, so that only the W-guy survives. But nature has programmed
in a way such that we can't easily do that, at least in the "mundane
state of consciousness". Near death or in altered consciousness state,
I don't know. Perhaps. This needs much more research to figure out.
So essentially the physical universe would be a type of consensus
amongst infinite instantiations of a mind? I guess your experience
could be called a "reverse déjà vu" or maybe a "jamais vu".
I ask we recount the votes!
:)
Bruno
This hypothesis makes sense to me as I am using a dualist
ontology, minds and bodies are not one and the same "thing" or
"process" - I reject Descartes' substance dualism - the isomorphism
implied by the duality is not between individual minds (logical
structures/algebras) and brains (topological spaces/groups), but
between something more like quotient of adjoint categories.
I can't find a good mathematical description of the concept yet...
On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:32 AM, Telmo Menezes
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 5:29 PM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Hi Telmo,
One event involved an email exchange that I has with two people.
We where discussing theories of emergent space-time. Nothing really
consequential. It didn't go anywhere as on of the persons said that
I had to wait for his paper to be published for further information
on his theory.
Thing is, now the only evidence that I can find that the events
happened are in my memory. All of the emails and so forth are gone,
as if they where wiped clean from our reality.
Thanks Stephen.
If I understand the ideas in Mitra's paper correctly, wouldn't it
require that you yourself had forgotten about the discussion?
On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 5:58 AM, Telmo Menezes
<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 8:53 PM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Hi Brent,
I have had a couple of experiences that proved to me that there
exists something like the theist God. Things that I can not explain
otherwise are some kind of "divine intervention" that saved my life.
Could there be an explanation that is completely secular?
Could it be explained by MWI + anthropic principle? You died in a
large number of branches, in the ones where you survived something
very unlikely necessarily happened?
I am open to such, but its like arguing that something like the
spontaneous unscrambling of an egg actually happened but one does
not have a collection of unimpeachable witnesses available.
Ever you have an experience that is like Mitra's history rewrite
idea http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825? I have!
I love this idea and I bet on its validity. That being said, how can
you know you had such an experience? Could you elaborate?
Cheers,
Telmo.
On Monday, October 6, 2014 2:15:44 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
Here's an interesting interview of a philosopher who is interested
in the question of
whether God exists. The interesting thing about it, for this list,
is that "God" is
implicitly the god of theism, and is not "one's reason for
existence" or "the unprovable
truths of arithmetic".
Brent
-------- Original Message --------
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/can-wanting-to-believe-make-us-believers/
Gary Gutting: "This is the 12th and last in a series of interviews
about religion that I
am conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is
Daniel Garber, a
professor of philosophy at Princeton University, specializing in
philosophy and science in
the period of Galileo and Newton. In a week or two, I'll conclude
with a wrap-up column on
the series."
...
Daniel Garber: "Certainly there are serious philosophers who would
deny that the arguments
for the existence of God have been decisively refuted. But even so,
my impression is that
proofs for the existence of God have ceased to be a matter of
serious discussion outside
of the domain of professional philosophy of religion. And even
there, my sense is that the
discussions are largely a matter of academic interest: The real
passion has gone out of
the question."
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Stephen Paul King
Senior Researcher
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Kindest Regards,
Stephen Paul King
Senior Researcher
Mobile: (864) 567-3099
[email protected]
http://www.provensecure.us/
"This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the
use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may
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confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may
be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination,
distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify
sender immediately and delete this message immediately."
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