On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs
involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the
equivalent - differentiation or whatever).
But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that
they are separate worlds.
But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation.
In fact they aren't even well defined, only approximations to
what's actually there, at least according to DD (and as usual
assuming I understood him correctly).
If "recombine" just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's
just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's
slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world.
I would say that below your substitition lebel, there is an infinity
of worlds/computations. It is just that your relevant brain state for
your consciousness is independent of the fact that the photon go
through hole one or two.
Maybe Deutsch thinks of it as splitting into two worlds and then
recombining at the detector screen.
He would say that there is never splitting, but your brain has a long
history, and it has favorized the position base, and that can be
justified by the decoherence theory.
Once the detection has occurred, a spot on the screen, then the
split has been amplified and entangled into the environment and is
statistically irreversible. Then that defines a classical world (in
my view). That world will not recombine with a world in which the
spot appears at a different place on the screen.
OK. We can define "world" by set of events closed for interaction.
Have you read Zeh's quantum darwinism? He attempts to explain why
we perceive a world whose stable observable features are the ones we
see. Deutsch has generally just assumed that the observable world
must have the classical character we see. Everett and Bohr assumed
what variable was classically measurable was defined by the choice
of apparatus; but that seems circular.
I agree much with Zeh, notably on its account of time. I have not read
the more recent publication, but quantum darwinism makes, as
computationalism, by generalizing Everett move, lead to a sort of
logical evolution of the physical laws.
I appreciate also Mittelstaedt different books, and Piron. And thanks
to Selesnick, my interest in Finkelstein has been revived.
But computatioanalism+computer science approache this from the other
side, with a different conception of realitry (more platonist than
aristotelian).
Bruno
Brent
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