My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > > > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've >> heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of >> an individual person. > > > The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought > experiments is to examine and get rid of that "semantic quibble", and yet > from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already > crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were > stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person > pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is > just ridiculous. > > >This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in >> 1957. > > > No it is not for 3 reasons: > > 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum > world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was > able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said > nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, > and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum > interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other > Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would > be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't > explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness > has nothing to do with his theory. > > 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to > think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's > just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. > > 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "he" is always > obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of > physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with > matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that > description, and so the word "he" conveys zero information. > > > a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same >> conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter >> transmitter would > > > Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a > physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is > uncertain. > > > both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third >> person viewpoint the duplication could be observed > > > If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in "comp" and except for a few > member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. > > > And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms > > > I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though > they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of > "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or > consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with > computers, " a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related > technology". > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
