On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.

Just saying it's "obviously wrong" doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact.

Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world.

Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition "history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear.

The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds. My point is that superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces.




I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book "Quantum Computing Since Democritus" is also very good).

What is his position on Everett?

/(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, "OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to calculate probabilities?" Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don't. Of course, part of what makes the question slippery is that it's not even completely clear what we mean by words like "exist"! Now, I'd say that quantum computing theory has sharpened the question in many ways, and actually answered some of the sharpened versions --- but interestingly, sometimes the answer goes one way and sometimes it goes the other! So for example, we have strong evidence that quantum computers can solve certain specific problems in polynomial time that would require exponential time to solve using a classical computer. Some Many-Worlders, most notably David Deutsch, have seized on the apparent exponential speedups for problems like factoring, as the ultimate proof that the various branches of the wavefunction must literally exist: "if they don't exist," they ask, "then where was this huge number factored? where did the exponential resources to solve the problem come from?" The trouble is, we've also learned that a quantum computer could NOT solve arbitrary search problems exponentially faster than a classical computer could solve them --- something you'd probably predict a QC could do, if you thought of all the branches of the wavefunction as just parallel processors. If you want a quantum speedup, then your problem needs a particular structure, which (roughly speaking) lets you choreograph a pattern of constructive and destructive interference involving ALL the branches. You can't just "fan out" and have one branch try each possible solution --- twenty years of popular articles notwithstanding, that's not how it works! We also know today that you can't encode more than about n classical bits into n quantum bits (qubits), in such a way that you can reliably retrieve any one of the bits afterward. And we have all lots of other results that make quantum-mechanical amplitudes feel more like "just souped-up versions of classical probabilities," and quantum superposition feel more like just a souped-up kind of potentiality. I love how the mathematician Boris Tsirelson summarized the situation: he said that "a quantum possibility is more real than a classical possibility, but less real than a classical reality." It's an ontological category that our pre-mathematical, pre-quantum intuitions just don't have a good name for./


http://intelligence.org/2013/12/13/aaronson/

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to