On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice,
but I am afraid you might be conscious.
It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where
everything is necessary and nothing is possible. It is the type
"[]f" (provable false), the "consistent inconsistent realities, the
type of dreams, wrongness, lies, and death (as geometrically they are
cul-de-sac world, in the Kripke semantics).
The whole problem comes from the fact that consciousness is maintained
in such realities, and the measure problem for the computationalist is
to derive the physical reality from the need of justifying long deep
lawfull type of physical dreams, in arithmetic.
But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in
this world
the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world'
and perhaps every possibility in between.
Not really. That would be the case if you rely *all* your decisions to
a measurement of polarization of some photon or qubit in the state 1/
sqrt(2) I0> + I1>.
But if, for some reason, you really prefer the decision based on I1>,
well, you don't need the quibit the, or prepare it in the state aI0> +
bI1>, such that a^2 is very close to one, and b^2 very close to zero
(with a^2 + b^2 = 1).
Feynman randomization does justifies the normal realities. That why
both classical eectrionical computer functions, and why we hope that
the quantum computer will function too. But that is what a
computationalist have to show with an a priori larger instantiation of
computations.
So in the 3p view, all choices balance out.
I think you are too quick here, Richard.
Everything consistent happens, but with constrained and different
relative proportions, and you have a partial control.
Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.
We certainly hope that the aberrant worlds are not too much frequent.
But thank to the smallness of Planck constant, the aberration seems to
just change a bit our DNA, and we manage as we can (we befit from them
too).
Once François Englert asked me why I took the lift, given that with
the many-world I can jump through the window.
I told him that jumping from one story, the QM probability is high
that I will survive with a broken leg, from two stories, I will
survive with two broken legs and two or one broken arm, from three
stories, I might survive with all arms and legs broken, + the back
broken, ... From the eleventh stories, I will survive 100% paralyzed,
from 25 stories, I might survive in a brain in a vat, and only God
knows where you might survive from 1000 stories. So I think that the
lift is more safe.
QM *does* look like an mean to get normal worlds above our digital
substitution level.
(Peter wrote that in his blog) and which seems inconsistent with
duplication.
You mean Peter Jones?
Bruno
Richard
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:01 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote:
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it
is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period
Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a
deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes.
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