On 10 November 2014 11:58, David Nyman <[email protected] <javascript:;>> wrote: > On 9 November 2014 23:16, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] <javascript:;>> wrote: > >> One could say that if the bill of materials includes the ingredients >> and laws governing the interactions between the ingredients, that's >> everything there is. If seemingly magical things, fairies and unicorns >> and conscious beings, come out of the mix that doesn't necessarily >> mean that the ontological assumptions are deficient, but it may mean >> (by elimination) that the beholder's cognitive capacity is limited. > > > AFAICT, the second sentence above stands in direct contradiction to the > first. If Graziano *really means to say* that the bill of materials is > restricted in the way you suggest - IOW, that it is truly "everything there > is" - then he cannot consistently *additionally believe* in either beholders > or their cognitive capacity.
Why not, if the bill of materials is sufficient to give rise to everything else? > But that conclusion would of course be both > absurd and is indeed directly contradicted by what he actually goes on to > say. Therefore I am forced to conclude that he is simply being inconsistent > in his supposed commitment to any such restricted bill of materials because > it is obvious that he openly relies on an indefinite variety of > supernumerary entities and relations that are neither entailed nor required > by it. > > The only really *consistent* view, under Graziano's presumably physicalist > assumptions, would be the elimination of all references to persons, beliefs, > cognitive abilities or indeed anything over and above the (assumed) > fundamental entities and relations of physics. Under his assumptions, > nothing whatsoever over and above this fundamental bill of materials is > presumed necessary to account for the indefinite evolution of any physical > state of affairs, which (lest we forget) is "all there is". What then is the > motivation to speak of persons, cognitive abilities or any other such > physically redundant conceits? Things are presumed to evolve, in precisely > the way they should, without the aid of any such supplementary notions, are > they not? If things evolve without the aid of the supplementary notions that does not necessarily mean that the supplementary notions are meaningless, non-existent or unimportant. > Graziano aim is to single out "consciousness" for special attention, but the > uncomfortable fact is that this particular razor has a very much more > radical scope. It carries on slicing until the very conceptual structures he > seeks to spare, and on which he continues to rely, lie in tatters. But then, > a conclusion as radical as *that* wouldn't leave him with very much more to > say, would it? Even more problematically, it wouldn't leave *him* at all. > > David > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:;>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <javascript:;>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
