On 29 Nov 2014, at 01:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/28/2014 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Nov 2014, at 04:27, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
> More likely we will make an AI that is intelligent, is not
conscious like a human with an inner narrative but is conscious in
some other way which will be very difficult for us to recognize.
With the obvious exception of our own, consciousness is not very
difficult to recognize, it is IMPOSSIBLE to recognize, and it
doesn't matter if it's another human or a computer. All we can
recognize is intelligent behavior and then try to make a
conclusion from that observation using one of the enumerable
theories about consciousness that are available. And all the many
consciousness theories are different from each other and all of
them work about equally well (or badly).
Some have testable consequences. You don't need to understand the
step 3, to understand the math parts, and the testability of the
theory extracted. In the "Brussel's thesis" I present the UDP (the
universal dovetailer *paradox*- only to provide the motivation for
the definition in the math part). (I was warned against
philosophers allergic to thought experiments!). In Lille, that was
not a problem, as there were no literary philosopher in the jury.
And having no facts that must be fitted to theory is why the
profession of consciousness theoretician is so incredibly easy and
why they are so common on the internet. However it's hard as hell
to find a good intelligence theory because it
must be compatible with a astronomical number of very diverse
facts, so it's not surprising that intelligence theoreticians are
very rare on the internet. Consciousness is easy
but intelligence is hard.
I think the contrary. Intelligence is basically very simple. It
requires no more than a universal machine. Well, at least two, to
be exact. A couple <child, mother>, but in an abstract sense, in
which the mother can be the arithmetical truth/reality (the
structure (N,0,+,*)), and the child any universal programs defined
and executed, relatively to oracles or to other universal programs.
I don't think that's enough. Intelligence must be more than the
mere possibility of learning, it must include the motivation to
learn and to act. Without a value system there is no reason to
learn and all knowledge is equally valuable - like the "knowledge"
obtained by video camera.
Take the worm again. The value might come from evolution, and the
motivation might be related to the programming of surviving, and this
can come from evolution without any meta-purpose from the par of the
worm. But this is for consciousness, and with non Löbian entities, it
is perhaps good to assume the "trivial" intelligence of the mute/
virgin universal machine.
Bruno
Brent
Consciousness is perhaps not that difficult. Once you accept it is
invariant for some recursive permutation at some description level,
then the incompleteness theorem explains it, I think. We got an
explanation of why self-consistency *appears* obvious to us, but is
incommunicable/non-justifiable, unless we invoke the notion of
truth, which is explained to be non-expressible, and makes
consciousness non definable. The math provides a general theory of
qualia, and it is testable because the quanta appears to be the
first person plural sharable of it.
The math shows in particular that a reflexive and symmetrical
structure appears at the place it should appear in case QM is
correct.
What *is* really difficult is the competence things, and its
development, as they grow on many incomparable lattices of
incomparable abilities. There are many results in theoretical
computer science, initiated with the work of Putnam, Blum, Gold,
Case & Smith, Royer, Oherson, ... and many others. There are many
beautiful theorems, like the theorem of Blum and Blum which answers
the question about what can be immeasurably more competent than a
machine? The answer is: a couple of machines! There also equivalent
speed-up theorem for the inference inductive abilities, and in
general the more errors machine can do, the more competent they can
become. There are no universal learning machine (universal
competence) unless you accept machine doing unbounded number of
errors, and with the ability to change their mind infinitely often,
even for equivalent theories (that is they change their mind
without experimental reason).
Those are theories of intelligence, in a sense, as they are
metatheories on learning strategies (competence development). It
studies the effect of intelligence of the many possible grows of
competence. It is necessarily a non constructive theory of
intelligence, but the contrary would have been astonishing, and
ring false with the absolute non definability of the first person
by the first person. Intelligence is not programmable, except
trivially by a meta-program like "Add and multiply and help
yourself". And hope, for enough memories notably.
You can find references by searching in the biblio of the Lille
thesis and the bibliography of the french long text.
Bruno
John K Clark
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