On 2/4/2015 12:14 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they
would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world to the mental world.
>
> But the definition of epiphenominalism includes that it necessarily accompanies the
phenomenon. So zombies are impossible.
>
By the definition of epiphenominalism, it's also an unfalsifiable proposition (that
consciousness follows from any particular physical configuration). Which ones does it
necessarily follow from and which ones does it not?
JKC's claim is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the phenomenon of intelligent
behavior - not of a particular physical configuration. The connection to particular
physical configurations, i.e. brains, is a more indirect inference from personal
experience of consciousness and its relation to one's physical state and one's similarity
to others.
According to epiphenominalism it's not possible to know.
But it's possible to have a theory that both explains and predicts the phenomenon. Does
that mean we know the theory is correct? - no, but that's the way to bet.
Brent
Perhaps if one atom is in the wrong place consciousness does not result and you end up
with a zombie.
Jason
> Brent
>
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