On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/4/2015 12:14 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world to the mental world. >> >> But the definition of epiphenominalism includes that it necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. So zombies are impossible. >> > > By the definition of epiphenominalism, it's also an unfalsifiable proposition (that consciousness follows from any particular physical configuration). Which ones does it necessarily follow from and which ones does it not? > > JKC's claim is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the phenomenon of intelligent behavior - not of a particular physical configuration. The connection to particular physical configurations, i.e. brains, is a more indirect inference from personal experience of consciousness and its relation to one's physical state and one's similarity to others. >
I'll let John comment on this because I think he disagrees that it's an epiphenominon. > According to epiphenominalism it's not possible to know. > > But it's possible to have a theory that both explains and predicts the phenomenon. Does that mean we know the theory is correct? - no, but that's the way to bet. That I have no problem with. My problem with epiphenominalism is that it's appears to me to be inconsistent. See Dennett's critique in the video I posted. Jason > > Brent > > Perhaps if one atom is in the wrong place consciousness does not result and you end up with a zombie. > > Jason > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
