On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 04 Feb 2015, at 06:02, Samiya Illias wrote: > > > > On 04-Feb-2015, at 12:01 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > >> >> Then reason shows that arithmetic is already full of life, indeed full of >> an infinity of universal machines competing to provide your infinitely many >> relatively consistent continuations. >> >> Incompleteness imposes, at least formally, a soul (a first person), an >> observer (a first person plural), a "god" (an independent simple but deep >> truth) to any machine believing in the RA axioms together with enough >> induction axioms. I know you believe in them. >> >> The lexicon is >> p truth God >> []p provable Intelligible (modal logic, G and G*) >> []p & p the soul (modal logic, S4Grz) >> []p & <>t intelligible matter (with p sigma_1) (modal logic, Z1, Z1*) >> []p & sensible matter (with p sigma_1) (modal logic, X1, X1*) >> >> You need to study some math, >> > > I have been wanting to but it seems such an uphill task. Yet, its a > mountain I would like to climb :) > > > 7 + 0 = 7. You are OK with this? Tell me. > > > OK > > > Are you OK with the generalisation? For all numbers n, n + 0 = n. Right? > > > Right :) > You suggest I begin with Set Theory? > > > No need of set theory, as I have never been able to really prefer one > theory or another. It is too much powerful, not fundamental. At some point > naive set theory will be used, but just for making thing easier: it will > never be part of the fundamental assumptions. > > I use only elementary arithmetic, so you need only to understand the > following statements (and some other later): > Please see if my assumptions/interpretations below are correct: > > x + 0 = x > if x=1, then 1+0=1 > > x + successor(y) = successor(x + y) > 1 + 2 = (1+2) = 3 > > Are you OK? To avoid notational difficulties, I represent the numbers by > their degree of parenthood (so to speak) with 0. Abbreviating s for > successor: > > 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ... > If the sequence represents 0, 1, 2, 3, ... > > Can you derive that s(s(0)) + s(0) = s(s(s(0))) with the statements just > above? > then 2 + 1 = 3 Samiya > > Bruno > > > > Samiya > > > > > > >> to see that this give eight quite different view the universal machines >> develop on themselves. >> > > Reminds me of this verse [http://quran.com/69/17 ]: > *And the angels are at its edges. And there will bear the Throne of your > Lord above them, that Day, eight [of them]. * > > > It is like that: The four first (plotinian) hypostases live harmonically > in the arithmetical heaven: > > > God > > Terrestrial Intelligible Divine Intelligible > > Universal Soul > > > > But then the Universal Soul falls, and you get the (four) matters, and the > "bastard calculus": > > > Intelligible terrestrial matter Intelligible Divine > matter > > Sensible terrestrial matter Sensible Divine matter > > > > Here divine means mainly what is true about the machine/number and not > justifiable by the numbers. > > > > > > > It provides a universal person, with a soul, consistent extensions, >> beliefs, and some proximity (or not) to God (which is the "ultimate" >> semantic that the machine cannot entirely figure out by herself (hence the >> faith). >> > > Interesting! > > > All universal machine looking inward discover an inexhaustible reality, > with absolute and relative aspects. > > Babbage discovered the universal machine, (and understood its > universality). The universal machine, the mathematical concept, will be > (re)discovered and made more precise by a bunch of mathematical logicians, > like Turing, Post, Church, Kleene. > > You are using such a universal system right now, even plausibly two of > them: your brain and your computer. They are a key concept in computer > science. They suffer a big prize for their universality, as it makes them > possible to crash, be lied, be lost, be deluded. They can know that they > are universal, and so they can know the consequences. > > The religion which recognizes the universal machine and her classical > theology might be the one which will spread easily in the galaxy in the > forthcoming millenaries. (Independently of being true or false, actually). > > Bruno > > > > > > Samiya > >> >> If you want to convince me, you have to first convince the universal >> person associated to the Löbian machine, I'm afraid. >> >> I am not pretending that the machine theology applies to us, but it is a >> good etalon to compare the theologies/religions/reality-conceptions. The >> problem is that we have to backtrack to Plato, where what we see is only >> the border of something, that we can't see, but yet can intuit and talk >> about (a bit like mathematics or music) >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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