On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of
>>>>> having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then
>>>>> superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will
>>>>> converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all
>>>>> superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We
>>>>> should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be
>>>>> friendly or it won't according to what is right.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that
>>>> the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must
>>>> remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different
>>>> superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying
>>>> niches just like what happens with Darwinism.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any
>>> actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be
>>> certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some
>>> role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to
>>>>> believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then
>>>>> superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the
>>>>> belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm 
>>>>> to
>>>>> the self.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal
>>>> personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious
>>>> fundamentalist.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious
>>> fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such
>>> a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not?
>>>
>>
>> This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I
>> would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense
>> of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is
>> very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with
>> 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies
>> a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about
>> the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like
>> believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged.
>>
>>
> I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that
> universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from
> my consideration of various problems of personal identity.
>

Right. We are in complete agreement then.
Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if
it could be considered a "preferable belief": it may be true and we are all
better off assuming it to be true.

Telmo.


>
>
> Jason
>
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