On 12 Feb 2015, at 12:19, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of
having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then
superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their
beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly
all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief
system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI,
it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right.
I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given
that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own
consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case,
we might have different superintelligences working under different
hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with
Darwinism.
Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform
any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it
never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for
survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be
before they become inactive.
Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder.
I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to
believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct,
then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct.
And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm
to others is harm to the self.
I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume
universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a
religious fundamentalist.
Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious
fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round?
Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why
not?
This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list.
I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the
informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that
the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can
believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling
into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your
senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of
reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like
believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged.
I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely
that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses
derived from my consideration of various problems of personal
identity.
Right. We are in complete agreement then.
Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I
wonder if it could be considered a "preferable belief": it may be
true and we are all better off assuming it to be true.
It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a
preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane.
It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of
the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves
to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially
correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will
repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead
to a threat to freedom.
If you are honest about your belief in universal personhood
I thought you were assuming it.
you won't be interested into manipulating the other versions of you
into servitude.
Why?
On the contrary, if they are myself, I feel I have the right to do to
myself what I want, and I might suffer, as a universal baby, from an
inconceivable curiosity.
I am the advocate of the devil, here. I mean only that I am not sure
about what exactly that universal baby want when crying.
I appreciate your ethic, and I wish you are correct, but I am not sure
it can be use a norm to be preferred. people can do experiences which
open their mind, but to ascribe virtue to anything publicly might lead
to the contraries. Cf the []*- [] difference.
This reminds me of Nietzschean slave morality: the slave cannot
conceive of true freedom, so he can only desire to become the
oppressor. But this is because he does not really believe in
universal personhood, otherwise he would understand true freedom.
What is true freedom if the slave cannot enslave itself?
Bruno
Telmo.
Like I said: it is double edged. It might be a type of knowledge
belonging to a []* \ [] sort of logic: you can grasp it from inside,
but it would not make sense to tell others. You can still suggest
means to access that knowledge, but not much more. I think, and
extrapolate from the "correct" machine self-reference.
Bruno
Telmo.
Jason
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