On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett >> Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and >> that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You >> remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish >> today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out >> as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some >> point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel >> that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push >> on a string. >> > > Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. > OMG, that means I've forgotten what the "P" in Bruno's juvenile homemade acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the peepee stuff Bruno is always talking about? > > Only personal experience is considered. > Who's personal experience? > With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify > your self with multiple past entities. > I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain you don't either, I only remember one. > > Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the > other direction of time? > Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when things don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like you've lost your personal identity? > > You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation > where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment > would experience the fork as subjective randomness. > Obviously > > Keep going from there. > I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is "life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find" and it's difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle like that. > > 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" is always >> obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe >> that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter >> duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or >> more) people who fit that description, and so the word "you" is ambiguous >> and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of >> personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept >> of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought >> experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In >> such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno >> does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. >> > > When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of personal > identity. > If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when Bruno uses the personal pronoun "you" as he does with reckless abandon in his "proof" what is John Clark supposed to make of it? > > When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two > third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal > identity to come into it. > It does when in Bruno's "proof" he goes on and on about how "you" will expect to see this and that but "you" will not expect to see that and this. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
