On 01 Mar 2015, at 02:29, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>> 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike
Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal
identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the
past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday
so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your
predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected
(and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in
your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel
that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying
to push on a string.
> Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI.
OMG, that means I've forgotten what the "P" in Bruno's juvenile
homemade acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the
peepee stuff Bruno is always talking about?
We have discuss this before. You are deliberately confusing. The P is
for Person, and the I for indeterminacy. As we have already explained
to you the FPI avoid the need to define personal identity, above the
fact that we accept we survive with an artificial brain.
In that case we can say clearly and without ambiguity that assuming
computationalisme and the correct susbstitution level choice:
1) the guy in Helsinki does survive at W and at M, seen from a third
observer (the 3p view).
2) the guy in Helsinki will survive from its 1p view at W or at M (and
that his confirmed by all the diary)
With the usual protocol.
> Only personal experience is considered.
Who's personal experience?
All the possible one appearing in the thought experience.
> With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to
identify your self with multiple past entities.
I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain
you don't either, I only remember one.
> Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in
the other direction of time?
Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when
things don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like
you've lost your personal identity?
> You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer
simulation where one thing differed in each instance of the
simulated environment would experience the fork as subjective
randomness.
Obviously
> Keep going from there.
I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is
"life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find"
and it's difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle
like that.
> 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" is
always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow
me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in
a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought
experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description,
and so the word "you" is ambiguous and conveys zero information.
Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but
then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal
identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought
experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go.
In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon
as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous.
> When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of
personal identity.
If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when
Bruno uses the personal pronoun "you" as he does with reckless
abandon in his "proof" what is John Clark supposed to make of it?
To take into account the fundamental key distinction between the 1p
and 3p view, well defined at the beginning of the post and papers.
> When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two
third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal
identity to come into it.
It does when in Bruno's "proof" he goes on and on about how "you"
will expect to see this and that but "you" will not expect to see
that and this.
Yes, but for a reason that Jason and Quentin proved to you to be
equivalent with the use of it in the MWI where you accept the use of
probability. Your argument that in one case the doppelgangers can met
and not in the other case has been shown unconclusive, more than one
time.
Imagine that the guy in Helsinki is told that soon after the
reconstitution in W and in M, he will be killed, in both place, in
such a way that none have the time to meet their double. In that case
probabilities would suddenly make sense, according to your criteria.
But then they continue to make sense even if we change our mind and
don't kill the guy in both place.
I am aware of your hand-waving. I answer in case someone is not aware
of it.
You have never given one rational reason to not move to the fourth
step of the argument.
You only use insult, dismissing, exclamation point, and repeat
questions already answered by many people.
You lost the point, and your persistent deny of this looks more and
more like trolling.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
