On Sunday, March 1, 2015, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> >> 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett >>> Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and >>> that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You >>> remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish >>> today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out >>> as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some >>> point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel >>> that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push >>> on a string. >>> >> > Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. >> > > OMG, that means I've forgotten what the "P" in Bruno's juvenile homemade > acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the peepee stuff Bruno > is always talking about? > > >> > Only personal experience is considered. >> > > Who's personal experience? > > > With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify >> your self with multiple past entities. >> > > I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain you > don't either, I only remember one. > > >> > Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the >> other direction of time? >> > > Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when things > don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like you've lost your > personal identity? > > >> > You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation >> where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment >> would experience the fork as subjective randomness. >> > > Obviously > > >> > Keep going from there. >> > > I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is "life is > like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find" and it's > difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle like that. > >> > 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" is always >>> obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe >>> that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter >>> duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or >>> more) people who fit that description, and so the word "you" is ambiguous >>> and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of >>> personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept >>> of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought >>> experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In >>> such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno >>> does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. >>> >> > When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of >> personal identity. >> > > If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when Bruno > uses the personal pronoun "you" as he does with reckless abandon in his > "proof" what is John Clark supposed to make of it? > > >> > When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two >> third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal >> identity to come into it. >> > > It does when in Bruno's "proof" he goes on and on about how "you" will > expect to see this and that but "you" will not expect to see that and this. > >
Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun "you"? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world with only one version of you. What about the MWI or other multiverse? What about a branching computer simulation? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
