On 01 Mar 2015, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2015 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Only personal experience is considered.
Who's personal experience?
All the possible one appearing in the thought experience.
In the functionalist theory of mind that allows for duplication or
substitution of brains, answers to questions of "Who?" are
constructed from experiences. Persons cannot be identified with
bodies, they are identified with sequences of experiences, and
especially experiences of remembering. In our ordinary experience
these sequences don't branch (although multiple personality disorder
may be an exception), but in hypothetical duplications they do and
then there are two or more sequences in the future sharing a single
past sequence. What names and/or pronouns assigned to these
sequences is just semantics. We could refer to the Helsinki-
>Washington sequence and the Helsinki-Moscow sequence.
OK. No problem.
It is because the first person get plural that we have to take into
account all such sequences.
After two iterations, for example there are four sequences, that four
persons with a different first person experiences, but by
computationalism we have already accepted that they are all equal in
right, and notably they are all equal to the person who was in
Helsinki, despite being all different from each other:
HMM
HMW
HWM
HWW
There is no paradox, nor any conceptual problem. We use the usual way
to use personal pronouns in the comp frame, and yes the transitivity
of personal product is false, but that is often the case in modal or
intensional contexts.
The FPI is only in the understanding that if we iterate such self-
duplication, the distribution of histories match the Bernouilli
distribution. Indeed, even exactly. The probability that the number of
"feeling to be reconstituted in W" is between x and y, will get closer
to the Gaussian integral from x to y, with the usual renormalization.
The rest is bad philosophy: that is philosophy which is used to
prevent progress, as it happens sometimes when religion are used to
prevent a science to develop.
Bruno
Brent
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