meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
The calculation written out on paper is a static thing, but the
result of that calculation might still be part of a simulation that
produces consciousness. Though, unless Barbour is right and the
actuality of time can be statically encoded in his 'time capsules
(current memories of past instances)', I was thinking in terms of a
sequence of these states (however calculated).
Yes, I agree that the computation should not have to halt (compute a
function) in order to instantiate consciousness; it can just be a
sequence of states. Written out on paper it can be a sequence of
states ordered by position on the paper. But that seems absurd,
unless you think of it as consciousness in the context of a world
that is also written out on the paper, such that the writing that is
conscious is /*conscious of*/ this written out world.
My present conscious state includes visual, auditory and tactile
inputs -- these are part of the simulation. But they need simulate
only the effect on my brain states during that moment -- they do not
have to simulate the entire world that gave rise to these inputs. The
recreated conscuious state is not counterfactually accurate in this
respect, but so what? I am reproducing a few conscious moments, not a
fully functional person.
But isn't it the case that your brain evolved/learned to interpret and
be conscious of these stimuli only because it exists in the context of
this world?
Yes.
But in the MGA (or Olympia) we are asked to consider a device which
is a conscious AI and then we are led to suppose a radically broken
version of it works even though it is reduced to playing back a
record of its processes. I think the playback of the record fails to
produce consciousness because it is not counterfactually correct and
hence is not actually realizing the states of the AI - those states
essentially include that some branches were not taken. Maudlin's
invention of Klara is intended to overcome this objection and provide
a counterfactually correct but physically inert sequence of states.
But I think it Maudlin underestimates the problem of context and the
additions necessary for counterfactual correctness will extend far
beyond "the brain" and entail a "world". These additions come for
free when we say "Yes" to the doctor replacing part of our brain
because the rest of the world that gave us context is still there.
The doctor doesn't remove it.
In the "yes doctor" scenario as reported by Russell, it talks only
about replacing your brain with an AI program on a computer. It does
not mention connecting this to sense organs capable of reproducing all
the inputs one normally gets from the world. If this is not clearly
specified, I would certainly say 'No' to the doctor. There is little
point or future in being a functioning brain without external inputs.
As I recall sensory deprivation experiments, subjects rapidly subside
into a meaningless cycle of states -- or go mad -- in the absence of
sensory stimulation.
The question as posed by Bruno, is whether you will say yes to the
doctor replacing part of your brain with a digital device that has the
connections to the rest of your brain/body and which implements the same
input/output function for those connections. Would that leave your
consciousness unchanged?
OK. If all the connections and inputs remain intact, and the digital
simulation is accurate, I don't see a problem. But I might object if the
doctor plans to replace my brain with an abstract computation in
Platonia -- because I don't know what such a thing might be, and don't
believe it actually exists absent some physical instantiation.
As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have not
yet seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind.
Bruce
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