On 29 Mar 2015, at 10:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
The calculation written out on paper is a static thing, but the
result of that calculation might still be part of a simulation
that produces consciousness. Though, unless Barbour is right and
the actuality of time can be statically encoded in his 'time
capsules (current memories of past instances)', I was thinking
in terms of a sequence of these states (however calculated).
Yes, I agree that the computation should not have to halt
(compute a function) in order to instantiate consciousness; it
can just be a sequence of states. Written out on paper it can be
a sequence of states ordered by position on the paper. But that
seems absurd, unless you think of it as consciousness in the
context of a world that is also written out on the paper, such
that the writing that is conscious is /*conscious of*/ this
written out world.
My present conscious state includes visual, auditory and tactile
inputs -- these are part of the simulation. But they need simulate
only the effect on my brain states during that moment -- they do
not have to simulate the entire world that gave rise to these
inputs. The recreated conscuious state is not counterfactually
accurate in this respect, but so what? I am reproducing a few
conscious moments, not a fully functional person.
But isn't it the case that your brain evolved/learned to interpret
and be conscious of these stimuli only because it exists in the
context of this world?
Yes.
But in the MGA (or Olympia) we are asked to consider a device
which is a conscious AI and then we are led to suppose a
radically broken version of it works even though it is reduced to
playing back a record of its processes. I think the playback of
the record fails to produce consciousness because it is not
counterfactually correct and hence is not actually realizing the
states of the AI - those states essentially include that some
branches were not taken. Maudlin's invention of Klara is intended
to overcome this objection and provide a counterfactually correct
but physically inert sequence of states. But I think it Maudlin
underestimates the problem of context and the additions necessary
for counterfactual correctness will extend far beyond "the brain"
and entail a "world". These additions come for free when we say
"Yes" to the doctor replacing part of our brain because the rest
of the world that gave us context is still there. The doctor
doesn't remove it.
In the "yes doctor" scenario as reported by Russell, it talks only
about replacing your brain with an AI program on a computer. It
does not mention connecting this to sense organs capable of
reproducing all the inputs one normally gets from the world. If
this is not clearly specified, I would certainly say 'No' to the
doctor. There is little point or future in being a functioning
brain without external inputs. As I recall sensory deprivation
experiments, subjects rapidly subside into a meaningless cycle of
states -- or go mad -- in the absence of sensory stimulation.
The question as posed by Bruno, is whether you will say yes to the
doctor replacing part of your brain with a digital device that has
the connections to the rest of your brain/body and which implements
the same input/output function for those connections. Would that
leave your consciousness unchanged?
OK. If all the connections and inputs remain intact, and the digital
simulation is accurate, I don't see a problem. But I might object if
the doctor plans to replace my brain with an abstract computation in
Platonia
The doctor propose a real physical computer. Either a cheap PC or a
more expensive MAC, but it is done with matter guarantied of stellar
origin!
-- because I don't know what such a thing might be,
Nor do I.
and don't believe it actually exists absent some physical
instantiation.
Do you thing prime numbers needs physics to exist? If yes, show me
what is wrong in Euclid's proof, which define and prove the
mathematical existence of the prime numbers without assuming anything
physical. Likewize, all computations can be proved to exists, and have
some weight, in a theory as weak as Robinson arithmetic.
The doctor will not propose an abstract immaterial brain to you. But
the problem, shown by the UD-Argument, is that you already have an
infinity of abstract immaterial brain in elementary arithmetic, and
you can detect the difference, and that leads to the necessity of
justifying the stability of the physical laws from a measure on all
computation, extending Everett methodology on Arithmetic.
As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have
not yet seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind.
I suspect you are quick here. Usually, people who criticizes the
reasoning have not study it, or have no idea of the mind-body problem
(hard problem of matter and consciousness). For a long time this has
been dismissed because words like "mind", or just "computer" (sic)
appear in the text. Since then, most interested scientists got the
point, and it has been peer reviewed many times. Problems subsists
with some group of bigot fundamentalists though; which sometimes can
have editorial influences. Nothing serious.
Nevertheless, I am still open that there is a "real" flaw, as it is a
subtle subject, and if you find one, believe me I will be pleased.
Bruno
Bruce
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