On 3/29/2015 1:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 29 mars 2015 09:03, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
>
> meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 3/28/2015 11:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 3/28/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The calculation written out on paper is a static thing, but the result of that
calculation might still be part of a simulation that produces consciousness. Though,
unless Barbour is right and the actuality of time can be statically encoded in his 'time
capsules (current memories of past instances)', I was thinking in terms of a sequence of
these states (however calculated).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I agree that the computation should not have to halt (compute a function) in
order to instantiate consciousness; it can just be a sequence of states. Written out on
paper it can be a sequence of states ordered by position on the paper. But that seems
absurd, unless you think of it as consciousness in the context of a world that is also
written out on the paper, such that the writing that is conscious is /*conscious of*/
this written out world.
>>>
>>>
>>> My present conscious state includes visual, auditory and tactile inputs -- these are
part of the simulation. But they need simulate only the effect on my brain states during
that moment -- they do not have to simulate the entire world that gave rise to these
inputs. The recreated conscuious state is not counterfactually accurate in this respect,
but so what? I am reproducing a few conscious moments, not a fully functional person.
>>
>>
>> But isn't it the case that your brain evolved/learned to interpret and be conscious
of these stimuli only because it exists in the context of this world?
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>>>> But in the MGA (or Olympia) we are asked to consider a device which is a conscious
AI and then we are led to suppose a radically broken version of it works even though it
is reduced to playing back a record of its processes. I think the playback of the
record fails to produce consciousness because it is not counterfactually correct and
hence is not actually realizing the states of the AI - those states essentially include
that some branches were not taken. Maudlin's invention of Klara is intended to overcome
this objection and provide a counterfactually correct but physically inert sequence of
states. But I think it Maudlin underestimates the problem of context and the additions
necessary for counterfactual correctness will extend far beyond "the brain" and entail a
"world". These additions come for free when we say "Yes" to the doctor replacing part
of our brain because the rest of the world that gave us context is still there. The
doctor doesn't remove it.
>>>
>>>
>>> In the "yes doctor" scenario as reported by Russell, it talks only about replacing
your brain with an AI program on a computer. It does not mention connecting this to
sense organs capable of reproducing all the inputs one normally gets from the world. If
this is not clearly specified, I would certainly say 'No' to the doctor. There is little
point or future in being a functioning brain without external inputs. As I recall
sensory deprivation experiments, subjects rapidly subside into a meaningless cycle of
states -- or go mad -- in the absence of sensory stimulation.
>>
>>
>> The question as posed by Bruno, is whether you will say yes to the doctor replacing
part of your brain with a digital device that has the connections to the rest of your
brain/body and which implements the same input/output function for those connections.
Would that leave your consciousness unchanged?
>
>
> OK. If all the connections and inputs remain intact, and the digital simulation is
accurate, I don't see a problem. But I might object if the doctor plans to replace my
brain with an abstract computation in Platonia -- because I don't know what such a thing
might be, and don't believe it actually exists absent some physical instantiation.
>
> As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have not yet seen any
argument that might lead me to change my mind.
Then as a MGA shows that computations do not supervene in realtime on the physical,
then as a physicalist you simply have to reject computationalism as a theory of mind.
The thing is no one is giving arguments to believe one or another... Bruno did only
show both assumptions cannot be true at the same time, he chose to keep for the sake of
the theory and find where that leads and how it could solve the mind body problem. Never
he asserts computationalism is true or that physicalism is false. Feel free to pursue on
the possibility that physicalism is true (or a complete other theory) to resolve that
same problem. But if you stay in the physicalist contest you can't use computations to
explain consciousness and that's what maudlin klara/olympia and MGA thought experiments
shows.
But I don't agree that they show that, or more accurately I think they show that
physicalism requires the context of a physical world. Bruno will say, with some
justification, that "physical" isn't defined. But that's because he's a Platonist and
assumes definitions must be axiomatic. I think ostensive definitions are more useful - at
least for defining "physical".
Brent
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