On 03 Apr 2015, at 01:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 3 April 2015 at 01:06, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
However, what you call "my" fuctionalism is a superset
of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain
with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical
device
animated by God, and preserve consciousness.
... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the
straightness.
It is not trivial because it makes this (if I may say so) rather
profound claim: that it is impossible even for God to make a device
that reproduces the observable function of the brain without also
reproducing any associated consciousness. Roger Penrose proposes that
the brain utilises non-computable physics and that therefore it is not
possible to reproduce either the observable function of the brain or
its consciousness using a digital computer.
Yes, he defends non-comp (even non-quantum-comp, unlike Hamerov).
This is logically
consistent,
OK, but this shows you agree that we can't prove comp. Only the
generalisation your-functionalism.
even if there is no actual evidence for it. John Searle,
on the other hand, believes that it is possible to reproduce the
observable function of the brain but that this would not necessarily
reproduce consciousness.
Yes, it is another way to disbelieve in comp: believing in zombie.
Given that consciousness actually exists,
which entails that there is a difference between being conscious and
not being conscious, this is not logically consistent because it would
lead to partial zombies.
Almost OK. What about someone who say that as long as 1/4 of its
biological brain is organic he is fully conscious, but once more that
3/4 of the brain is digital, then it becomes a total zombie. In that
case: no partial zombie.
(just try to find a logical loophole ..., don't mind to much, I do
agree with "Chalmers' fading qualia point").
It is my contention that
the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O
behaviour
of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated
consciousness will follow necessarily.
OK.
I think you get close to "prove" the half of comp "yes doctor", as
everybody
agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we
cannot
give very powerful evidences for it).
Then the proof of "yes doctor" use the fact that partial zombiness
makes no
sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we
believe in
things like a "consciousness volume" (on which the anosognosia
would bear
on).
I don't see how that could make sense. It is sufficient to consider
not special cases where the change is small or memory and cognition
are deficient, but a general case where the change in consciousness is
extreme and the person's cognition is intact. If you claim that it is
possible to radically change the "consciousness volume" without
someone noticing then I think that is tantamount to claiming that
consciousness does not exist.
I agree.
The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can
only
present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence
of the
Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence
of Mars,
or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong
evidence.
It would be on that strong sense of "proof" that my critics would
bear on. A
bit like Russell's critics on the MGA.
I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the
world (although going from the general case of what I call
functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and
you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends
on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know
it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough
change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational
definition then I can find no meaning in the word "consciousness".
You make your point. For some reason, I have still a little doubt, but
I might need to just think a bit more. Some of my neurons make strike
because they want me sleeping a bit more.
My point is that we cannot prove comp, but I agree that even God
cannot refute "your-functionalism".
A perfect zombie does not make sense, but a non-comp person can of
course decide that some or other person are zombie or have no soul,
but then it is the usual insult of fear of the other. We might also
get evidence against comp, like never succeeding in making an
artificial brain. That could mean not that comp is false, but that the
level might be low. In that case the personal with artificial brains
would notice the difference, and some output would be different.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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