On 2 April 2015 at 18:37, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then > it would be possible to make partial zombies. If partial zombies are > possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or > lacking qualia, which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; > not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all. So if > consciousness exists, comp must be true. > > > That reasoning might asses that comp or your functionalism is provable, but > comp, as I defined it, use Church-thesis (if only to get a universal > dovetailer), and this gives one way to refute comp: to find a function that > human can compute, but no computer could. It is hard to imagine, but it is > logically possible (that is why attempt to refute CT continue to be made).
If the brain utilises non-computable functions then CT is false and it will not be possible replace part of the brain with a computer, so comp is false. However, what you call "my" fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. > Then as I said, anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, making > consciousness "non-existing", I could agree with this, but the partial > zombie might not agree in the sense that it would say: no, my consciousness > has not changed (despite some god could say, yes, the volume of its > consciousness has drop 1/2, but he can't see that as he is amnesic of its > precedent volume of consciousness. Again, this is close to non-sense to me, > and eventually I might think that (comp v functionalism) is provable. > Interesting point. I will dig on this ... hoping to find sometime. I have to > go. Note that (comp v functionalism(yours) = functionalism(yours). It is not > Putnam functionalism (which is comp, even with some "high" level > substitution level). > You seem going to change my mind on something about comp/functionalism. > > Bruno > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
