> On 4 Apr 2015, at 7:32 am, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On 4/2/2015 4:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the
>> world (although going from the general case of what I call
>> functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and
>> you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends
>> on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know
>> it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough
>> change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational
>> definition then I can find no meaning in the word "consciousness".
>
> I don't understand how that applies to someone who, for example, is red-green
> colorblind. Aren't they partial-zombies by your definition? They may come
> to realize that they don't distinguish the full spectrum, just as we
> realize we don't see infrared. Supppose the colorblind person used to see
> colors but lost the ability (as my mother did after cataract surgery)? She
> realized it by noticing that things that used to be colorful weren't anymore.
> But like the person born colorblind, she didn't directly experience a qualia
> of being colorblind.
She noticed a difference and there was also an objective change in her ability
to discriminate between a colours. A partial zombie would not notice a
difference and there would be no test that could find a difference.
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