On 02 Apr 2015, at 14:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 2 April 2015 at 18:37, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not
true then
it would be possible to make partial zombies. If partial zombies are
possible then there would be no difference between you having
qualia or
lacking qualia, which is equivalent to saying consciousness does
not exist;
not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all.
So if
consciousness exists, comp must be true.
That reasoning might asses that comp or your functionalism is
provable, but
comp, as I defined it, use Church-thesis (if only to get a universal
dovetailer), and this gives one way to refute comp: to find a
function that
human can compute, but no computer could. It is hard to imagine,
but it is
logically possible (that is why attempt to refute CT continue to be
made).
If the brain utilises non-computable functions then CT is false
I guess you mean non-computable by a computer. But computable by a
human.
and it
will not be possible replace part of the brain with a computer, so
comp is false.
Yes. That's was my point.
However, what you call "my" fuctionalism is a superset
of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain
with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device
animated by God, and preserve consciousness.
... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness.
It is my contention that
the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour
of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated
consciousness will follow necessarily.
OK.
I think you get close to "prove" the half of comp "yes doctor", as
everybody agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not
mean we cannot give very powerful evidences for it).
Then the proof of "yes doctor" use the fact that partial zombiness
makes no sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if
we believe in things like a "consciousness volume" (on which the
anosognosia would bear on).
The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can
only present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence
of the Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the
existence of Mars, or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just
give strong evidence.
It would be on that strong sense of "proof" that my critics would bear
on. A bit like Russell's critics on the MGA.
Bruno
Then as I said, anosognosia might make conceivable partial
zombiness, making
consciousness "non-existing", I could agree with this, but the
partial
zombie might not agree in the sense that it would say: no, my
consciousness
has not changed (despite some god could say, yes, the volume of its
consciousness has drop 1/2, but he can't see that as he is amnesic
of its
precedent volume of consciousness. Again, this is close to non-
sense to me,
and eventually I might think that (comp v functionalism) is provable.
Interesting point. I will dig on this ... hoping to find sometime.
I have to
go. Note that (comp v functionalism(yours) = functionalism(yours).
It is not
Putnam functionalism (which is comp, even with some "high" level
substitution level).
You seem going to change my mind on something about comp/
functionalism.
Bruno
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