On 14 Apr 2015, at 00:21, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even if some protocol is used to keep both copies experiencing exactly the same stimuli, there are still two first person views. I don't think that a first person view and a personal identity are the same thing.
In the math part, the 3-self is handled by "[]A", and the 1-self is handled by "[]A & A".
G* proves that they are equivalent, they grasp the same A, but G does not, which means that from the 1 and 3 p views of the machine they look different. Indeed they obey quite different logic, and also "[]A" can be defined by the machine, but "[]A & A" cannot be defined. In fact the machine which introspect itself cannot give a name or any 3p description of its 1-self.
Note that the 1-self is real. The illusion is real. What is unreal is that we are different first person. That is a relative indexical, on the same par as "here" and "now" ...
Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
