On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com <mailto:
>> johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
>>     had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
>> uncertainty
>> That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a
>> logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the
>> result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you
>> have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that
>> this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
>>
>
> You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case --
> the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't
> further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let the
> copies sit down together and have a chat.
>

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy
sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be
transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not make
the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way.

>
> Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds
> idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
>
> I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according
to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).

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