On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> LizR wrote: > >> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <[email protected] <mailto: >> [email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno >> had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of >> uncertainty >> That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a >> logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the >> result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you >> have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that >> this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective. >> > > You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case -- > the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't > further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let the > copies sit down together and have a chat. > That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way. > > Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds > idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat. > > I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
