LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy
sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be
transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not
make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through
either way.
No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that
they were the same person.
Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which
according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).
In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made
that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is basically
to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a link with the MWI of
quantum mechanics. This may not always have been made explicit, but the
intention is clear. Step 3 does not succeed in this because the
inference to FPI depends on a flawed concept of personal identity.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
