On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> LizR wrote: >> >>> On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: >>> >>> Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that >>> Bruno >>> had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of >>> uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 >>> is only a small >>> step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday >>> consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be >>> duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter >>> duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to >>> what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective. >>> >>> >>> You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the >>> case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance >>> and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion >>> if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat. >>> >>> That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy >>> sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be >>> transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not make >>> the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way. >>> >> >> No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that >> they were the same person. >> >> Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different >>> worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat. >>> >>> I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ? >>> This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according >>> to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains). >>> >> >> In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made >> that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. > > > Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The > respect/civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so > for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to see how > often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in sincerity of > intellectual debate. > > This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm sitting. > I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to address say Telmo's > request for clarification in Bruno's use of phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or > pedagogical demonstrations on "the* work* arithmetic existentially > *actualizes/gets > done*", clarification on Russell's use of "robust", physicalist theories > that don't eliminate consciousness etc. > > > Good and interesting questions indeed. > > I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the phi_i, > the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact that the > arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to merely generates > descriptions of them. > > I am bit buzy right now. Feel free to tell me which one of those point > seems to you the more interesting, or funky. > Funkiest would be "arithmetical reality simulates computations" aka free lunch :) But I've picked up and guess that people seem to miss use of "phi_i" or "Sigma 1 sentences" and such terms. So, you thought you could offer me a hand and... I take the arm and more: 1 of those point = 3 + infinite possibility of "other such terms". PGC- Zombie hunting armchair ninja of numbers. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
