On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/16/2015 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com
<mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
<mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing
that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal
everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different
conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than
"Will I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I
suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the
argument goes through either way.
No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not
agree that they were the same person.
Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical
computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable
assumption for brains).
In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was
repeated made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.
Step 3 is basically to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a
link with the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always have
been made explicit, but the intention is clear.
It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize
what they add themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid.
People who does that criticize only themselves, not the argument
presented.
Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI
depends on a flawed concept of personal identity.
Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is
step 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then the translation in arithmetic show how
to already extract the logic of the observable so that we might
refute a form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory of
knowledge). That main point there is that incompleteness refutes
Socrates argument against the Theaetetus,
Which argument do you refer to? Theaetetus puts forward several
theories of knowledge which Socrates attempts to refute.
That's true.
I was referring to the definition of knowledge by "true justified
opinion": the passage from []A (rational opinion, justified
proposition) to []A & A (justified opinion which is also true).
Incompleteness (the impossibility to prove []f -> f) gives an
arithmetical sense to that move, as the logic of []A, which is G, will
obey to a different logic than the logic of []A & A. []f does not
imply f, from the machine's view, but []f & f does trivially imply f.
Bruno
Brent
and we can almost directly retrieve the Parmenides-Plotinus
"theology" in the discourse of the introspecting universal (Löbian)
machine.
Bruno
Bruce
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