On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> 2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <
>> [email protected]
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning,
>>> or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no.
>>
>>
>> Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even
>> if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem
>> does not preclude perfect copying.
>>
>> Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your
>> brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you
>> remain the same person.
>>
>>
> That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is
> not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature
> did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn
> doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is
> impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or
> going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that
> indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a
> problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and
> still want what you're saying to be meaningfull)
>

The no clone theorem refers to physical copying, so it isn't relevant if
consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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