To summarise the summary...

Hypothetically, we have some computing machine that generates a conscious
experience. Since computation is deterministic, this will create the *same*
conscious experience if we re-run it duplicating the same initial state and
inputs. (For example, each run might give rise to the following report "I
awoke and found myself on a hillside, saw a white rabbit run past, thought
it was odd that it was wearing a waistcoat and carrying a pocket watch,
answered my mobile phone, and now I'm speaking to you.")

Now we remove unused parts of the machinery, and verify that running it
produces the same output. Then we remove arbitrary amounts of the
processing machanism, which we replace with recordings of their output.
Ultimately we remove the entire machine and play back a recording of the
state of every component, and, we assume, get the same output as we did
when the machinery was performing computations. (We may even turn the
recording into a static film, or a book of instructions, and require that
an external observer brings the consciousness to life through their
actions.)

The question is, what - if anything - does this prove?

Possible answer (it seems to me) include:

1. it shows that consciousness doesn't exist

2. it shows that a recording can be conscious

3. it shows that a recording can *appear* conscious (but then at which
point in the removal process did the machine stop being conscious?)

4. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence
consciousness isn't the result of computation

5. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence, if
consciousness *is* the result of computation, it can't be supported by a
physical machine.

Any others I've missed?

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