On 26 May 2015, at 06:37, LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp" means,
least of all Bruno.
Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of Turing-
emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.
That is the idea, but the way you say it can be misleading.
Consciousness is a first person attribute, and you cannot write A = B,
if A is first person and B is third person. So consciousness is not a
computation. It is associates to computation, like you can associate
the truth that 2+2=4 with the number of bottles of milk in the fridge.
The idea that we may one day create AIs is based on the same
assumption.
Yes. Logically COMP implies STRONG AI, but the reverse is false
(Machine can be conscious does not ential that only machine can be
conscious, logically).
There are a couple of extra assumptions to do with certain
mathematical ideas being correct (e.g. the Church-Turing thesis, I
believe).
Yes. Although we could easily not use it, but then people comes with
statement: what if we are not Turing machine, or combinators, or
numbers, and we have to explain Church-Thesis anyway.
But I believe it's a fairly standard theory used by a lot of
scientists - Hugh Everett III for example used it in his thesis.
He uses mechanism (arguably), but he does not refer to Church thesis
nor anything in computer science. He uses just he idea that we store
our memories in the manner of some automata.
For clarity I have called this comp1 and Bruno's results derived
from it comp2, but unless someone can show a fault in the argument
connecting them this is a purely nominal distinction.
Good :)
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.